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RISK PERCEPTION AND WORST-CASE CONTINGENCY PLANNING: AN EXAMINATION OF 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE INSIDERS WITHIN A MAJOR METROPOLITAN AREA 
CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION 
Bulk quantiUes of flammable and toxic industrial chemicals are found at 
manufacturing, processing, storage and transportation facilities across the United 
States, in many cases co-located with residential populations. Each such facility 
presents risk to offsite populations as a function of the inherent threats of the 
materials present and the various engineering and administrative controls in 
place to reduce that risk. Recent analysis by the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency (USEPA) found that least 123 U.S. facilities each keep 
amounts of toxic chemicals onsite that, if released, would endanger more than 1 
million people (Pianin 2002). In its own review, the Office of the Army Surgeon 
General concluded that as many as 2.4 million people could be killed or injured in 
a terrorist attack against a U.S. toxic chemical facility in a densely populated area 
(Pianin 2002). Such threats are amplified by the perception of disasters as rare, 
unexpected events, even with 60,000 chemical accidents reported in the United 
States each year (Environment News Service 1999). 
Current disaster and emergency management (DEM) programs differ from 
traditional long-term environmental assessment and remediation programs in that 
DEM focuses on planning for acute, relatively rare, catastrophic events unfolding 
at unexpected times under uncontrolled conditions, often involving direct threats 
to human health and welfare. In such an environment, functionality takes the 
lead, particularly when constrained by limited resources or the simple reality of 
being unable to intercede effectively once an event occurs. A classic example is 
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planning or attempting to evacuate large areas following chemical releases when 
the likely reality is that the expectation of successfully moving tens or hundreds 
of thousands of people under emergency conditions is optimistic at best. Further 
adding to the problem is limited or no warning time, as the agent of concern will 
almost certainly have dispersed over the receiving area before response action 
can even be initiated. Classic DEM approaches follow no strict protocols, are 
dominated by military and fire service command and control models (Drabek 
1991) and focus on response, not prevention. Such an approach is protective 
only of general populations, not specific individuals. However, with the drivers of 
urgency and efficiency, these limitations remain standard design criteria and are 
simply incorporated into contingency plans. Thus as a practical matter even in 
the best of situations, the result is that only most of the people within an affected 
area are protected most of the time, hardly comforting to anyone. 
As the basis of ,all emergency planning and response activities, it is critical 
that the facility contingency plan accurately identify, assess and communicate 
risks, and this responsibility falls in large part to the facility personnel developing 
the plan. However, intentionally or not, organizations tend to underestimate risk. 
Ignoring the possibility of disaster, paying attention to nuisance problems, 
neglecting complaints and ignoring warning signs ultimately leads to many 
disasters (Turner 1976) while a "disqualification heuristic" leads organizations to 
misperceive risk and assign inadequate risk factors by disregarding unlikely 
events when framing scenarios (Clarke 1993). Thus, the paradox of reliance on 
organizations to prevent or adequately respond to incidents since they base 
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planning and expectations of success on limited past experience and 
institutionalize the plans and confidence that follows (Clarke and Short 1993). 
Such "fantasy documents" (p. 1040) reflect ideal conditions and unrealistic 
expectations, serving to convince audiences that experts have considered every 
contingency (Clarke and Perrow 1996). As a result, misplaced confidence and 
decreased vigilance puts all components of society at risk. 
Statement of the Problem 
A fundamental tenet of emergency response is preservation of life first, property 
and the environment second. Response agencies and adjacent populations 
base risk perception, and thus preparation, almost entirely on published 
contingency plans that typically reflect only direct loss experience and subjective 
probability ranking. Such plans may not consider potentially catastrophic events 
and offsite consequences requiring immediate and effective response for fire, 
medical and evacuation services. The problem, therefore, is that contingency 
plans that underestimate risk and do not accurately depict worst-case scenarios 
significantly increase vulnerability and risk for facility, response and offsite 
personnel. 
Purpose of the Study 
"Insiders" as referenced in this research include facility Environmental, Health 
and Safety Managers, State and Federal On-Scene Coordinators and Local 
Emergency Responders, and it is within this group that risk from the participant 
facilities is identified, debated and eventually defined and addressed. This study 
will attempt to address two specific research questions. First, how do insiders 
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perceive risk and define worst-case scenarios? Second, how does risk 
perception drive contingency planning? These questions are critical because 
insiders who perceive risk as low or who disqualify potential worst-case 
scenarios from consideration may be more likely to develop contingency plans 
not sufficiently protective of affected populations and facilities. The effect is 
exacerbated by the use of facility plans by Local Emergency Responders as the 
foundation for developing Area Contingency Plans, which represent planning and 
response resources committed across a larger area or region. This research 
may prove useful to facility Environmental, Health and Safety Managers, 
emergency responders, regulatory agencies and potentially affected populations 
since for each of these groups it is critical that contingency plans address 
realistic worst-case scenarios to properly allocate resources and prevent or 
safely manage incidents. 
Theoretical Frame 
The focus of this research is on insider risk perception and how those 
perceptions drive contingency planning. While the researcher neither finds nor 
proposes a single theory that universally explains the tendency of organizations 
to underestimate risk and embrace contingency plans as the ultimate 
management tool, Clarke's (1993) disqualification heuristic is a key contributor. 
When risk perception does not reflect scientifically assessed risk, decision-
makers can protect themselves from seriously considering the likelihood of 
disasters, preserving resources by constructing outcomes that avoid extensive 
response preparedness. Underestimating or disqualifying risk simplifies the 
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process of controlling it, making "adequate" planning and preparedness a near-
certainty. As contingency plans are institutionalized, confidence in the ability to 
manage all hazards with minimal cost and effort grows, perpetuating the myths of 
low risk and emergency preparedness. 
CHAPTER 2: REGULATORY BACKGROUND 
Introduction 
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There are myriad regulations related to activities conducted at the participant 
facilities. The purpose of this regulatory review is to provide context and 
background information on current or pending Federal programs and 
requirements relevant to the proposed research. Local or State revisions or 
additions are not addressed for two reasons. First, those standards are outside 
the scope of this study and, secondly, such an analysis would potentially reveal 
the setting of the research, violating a confidentiality protection offered to each 
participant. Not intended to be an exhaustive review of every applicable 
standard, this review groups regulatory controls of chemical facilities into six 
major programs which fairly reflect activities related to the scope of this study: 
Occupational Safety, Waste Management, Hazardous Material Transportation, 
Pollution Prevention, Community Emergency Planning, Emergency Response 
and Security, concluding with Summary of Regulatory Review, which briefly 
summarizes and relates weaknesses in the current structure to the research. 
Occupational Safety 
Three relevant occupational safety programs are Hazard Communication 
(HazCom), Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response 
(HAZWOPER) and Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals 
(PSM). As a group, these standards address identification, control and 
communication of hazards in the workplace. Each requires extensive training 
and record keeping for employees and contractors as well as documentation of 
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safe work practices, process and chemical information and detailed procedures 
to be followed in the event of response to an emergency (Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration 2002). None of these standards are concerned with 
offsite activities or impacts with the exception of HAZWOPER, which addresses 
emergency response activities conducted by response Teams in various 
locations, such as a HazMat Team covering an entire city. However, even in 
those situations, the standard pertains only to safety of the response Team, not 
the public. 
Waste Management 
Waste management is addressed under the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA), which gives the USEPA authority to control the 
generation, transportation, treatment, storage and disposal of hazardous and 
nonhazardous waste as well as underground tanks storing petroleum and other 
hazardous substances. Covered facilities must prepare and implement a written 
emergency contingency plan that includes design and operation parameters, 
minimizing potential releases, emergency operations, evacuation plans and 
arrangements with local authorities (United States Environmental Protection 
Agency 2002c). 
Hazardous Material Transportation 
Transportation of hazardous materials, including hazardous waste, is addressed 
through United States Department of Transportation (USDOT) regulations, which 
cover all aspects of commercial hazardous material shipment including 
classification of materials, placarding, packaging performance, shipping papers 
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(manifests) and registration and training of drivers and other "hazmat" 
employees. Functions are consolidated into five categories: regulatory 
development; enforcement; training and information dissemination; domestic and 
international standards; and inter-agency cooperative activities (United States 
Department of Transportation 2002). 
Pollution Prevention 
Pollution prevention is addressed under the Oil Pollution Act (OPA), Spill 
Prevention, Control and Countermeasures (SPCC), and Clean Water Act (CWA) 
programs. OPA and SPCC specifically address storage of petroleum products at 
locations potentially affecting navigable (inland) and coastal waters and require 
facilities to develop written plans for petroleum management and to implement 
spill prevention, containment and other countermeasures (United States 
Environmental Protection Agency 2001b and 2001d). The·CWA authorizes each 
of these programs and additionally sets allowable pollutant concentration limits 
for ambient waters (United States Environmental Protection Agency 2001 e). 
Community Emergency Planning 
Community emergency planning is addressed through the Emergency Planning 
and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA). EPCRA is intended to provide 
local community access to information about chemical hazards and to improve 
state and local emergency response capabilities through four main objectives: 
local emergency response planning efforts; improved emergency notification in 
the event of a release of hazardous chemicals; hazardous chemical inventory 
reporting; and development of baseline data on chemical releases into the 
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environment (United States Environmental Protection Agency 2001 c). To 
implement EPCRA, Congress required each state to appoint a State Emergency 
Response Commission (SERC), develop Emergency Planning Districts and to 
name a Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC) for each district (United 
States Environmental Protection Agency 2004). The goal of the LEPC is to 
develop broad representation by firefighters, health officials, government and 
media representatives, community groups, industrial facilities and emergency 
managers to ensure that all necessary elements of the planning and response 
process are represented. All information submitted pursuant to EPCRA 
regulations is publicly accessible unless protected by an approved trade secret 
claim. 
The Risk Management Program (RMP) is built upon existing industry 
codes and standards, requiring approximately 15,000 facilities of all sizes that 
use or store certain flammable or toxic substances at or above threshold 
quantities to develop a Risk Management Plan (United States Environmental 
Protection Agency 2001 a), and is the only regulatory program to evaluate 
potential off-site consequences and "worst-case scenarios." The plan must 
include a(n): hazard assessment; accident history; evaluation of worst-case and 
alternative releases; prevention program that includes safety precautions and 
maintenance, monitoring, and training; and an emergency response program 
(United States Environmental Protection Agency 1999). Two unique components 
of the RMP are the analysis of the specified worst-case scenario (WCS) and 
projection of offsite consequences and affected receptors through an Offsite 
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Consequence Analysis (OCA). Such information aids local fire, police and 
emergency response personnel who must prepare for and respond to chemical 
accidents, and is useful to citizens in understanding the chemical hazards in 
communities. The USEPA originally anticipated that making the plans available 
to the public would stimulate communication between industry and the public to 
improve accident prevention and emergency response practices . at the local 
level. However, since the terrorist attacks of September 11 , 2001, public access 
to these and other planning and consequence documents has been severely 
restricted. Effectiveness of Risk Management Plans is further handicapped by 
the use of generic receptor population estimates and generalized modeling using 
exposure guidelines such as Emergency Response Planning Guidelines 
(ERPGs). Though highly regarded by response agencies, these guidelines are 
not based on acute exposure studies, are protective only of "most individuals in 
the general population" and do not contain the safety factors normally 
incorporated into exposure guidelines (United States Department of Energy 
1998). This leads to Offsite Consequence Analysis mapping of chemical plumes 
based on many standardized assumptions with no way to quantify effects or 
receptors. 
Federal Emergency ManagementAgency (FEMA) and National Response 
Team (NRT) publications are limited in scope and address general industry, 
business and/or state and local planning agencies. They offer only basic reviews 
of regulatory programs and general information on vulnerability analysis, incident 
preparedness, hazard assessment, response coordination, recovery operations, 
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business maintenance, damage assessments and agency roles (Federal 
Emergency Management Agency n.d. and 2001; National Response Team 
2001 ). 
Emergency Response 
Emergency response by federal agencies to hazardous substance releases is 
addressed under the National Contingency Plan (NCP) and the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response and Cleanup Liability Act (CERCLA). The NCP is the 
federal government's blueprint for responding to oil and hazardous substance 
releases (United States Environmental Protection Agency 2002b) and is 
authorized by the CWA and CERCLA. CERCLA, commonly known as 
Superfund, provides broad Federal authority to respond directly to releases or 
threatened releases of hazardous substances that may endanger public health or 
the environment. Two kinds of response actions are authorized: short-term 
removals, including emergencies, where actions may be taken to address 
releases or threatened releases requiring prompt response; and long-term 
remedial response actions to reduce the dangers associated with releases or 
threats of releases of hazardous substances that are serious, but not 
immediately life threatening (United States Environmental Protection Agency 
2002a). 
Security 
American Chemistry Council (ACC) documents are designed to assist member 
facilities in assessing, improving and preserving security of facility property, 
records, personnel and electronic systems through the use of audits, training, 
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surveillance, drug and alcohol testing, access control, hiring practices, weapons 
and behavior policies, crisis management and threat awareness and assessment 
(American Chemistry Council 2002a). The ACC Security Code of Management 
Practices is a Responsible Care® initiative intended to enhance security. In June 
2002, adoption of this code became mandatory for all ACC members. It 
addresses: management practices; analysis of threats, vulnerability and 
consequences; implementation of security measures; information and cyber-
security; documentation; training, drills and guidance; communication; response 
to security threats and incidents; audits; third-party verification; management of 
change; and continuous improvement (American Chemistry Council 2002b). 
The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response 
Act of 2002 addresses preparation for and response to intentional acts of 
bioterrorism and applies specifically to potable water treatment systems. 
Community systems serving greater than 3,300 persons must: conduct a 
vulnerability assessment; certify and submit a copy of the assessment to the 
USEPA Administrator on a size-weighted schedule, with larger systems due first; 
prepare or revise an emergency response plan incorporating the results of the 
vulnerability assessment; and certify to the USEPA Administrator that the system 
has completed or updated their emergency response plan (United States 
Environmental Protection Agency 2003). The program is completely oriented 
toward physical, electronic and administrative security measures and includes no 
input or review outside of the specific individuals preparing the assessment and 
plan. 
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The Sandia Laboratories/Department of Justice (DOJ) Chemical Facility 
Vulnerability Assessment Methodology (CFVAM) is a security assessment tool 
that provides vulnerability information and incorporates response measures to 
mitigate the consequences of a successful attack. The 13-step process provides 
a screening procedure for chemical facilities to identify critical areas that are of 
greatest concern with respect to a potential oft-site release due to an attack. The 
effectiveness of protection systems is evaluated and relative risk estimated as a 
function of the severity of consequences of an undesired event, the adversary 
attack potential and the likelihood of adversary success in causing the undesired 
event. If the risks are deemed unacceptably high, recommendations can be 
developed for measures to reduce them (United States Department of Justice 
2002). This methodology is the current elective standard for chemical facility 
self-assessment; however vulnerability assessments being performed by 
chemical facilities and water treatment systems are restricted from public input or 
access and will be reviewed only on demand by the United States Department of 
Homeland Security (OHS) (lnsideEPA 2003). 
The Chemical Security Act of 2001 (CSA), S.1602, would designate high 
priority facilities based on specific processes and chemicals and require them to 
take immediate measures to prevent releases caused by criminal acts. Specified 
measures include: reduced usage and storage of chemicals; process 
modifications; implementation of inherently safe processes; and improved 
mitigation, response and security (Corzine et al. 2001 ). This bill was 
reintroduced on 1/14/2003 as "S.157: A bill to help protect the public against the 
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threat of chemical attacks," and is now referred to as the Chemical Security Act 
of 2003. The scope and intent of the original bill remains intact, and the status is: 
Read twice and referred to the Committee on Environment and Public Works 
(Corzine et al. 2003). 
The movement of most emergency planning, incident management and 
recovery functions into the Department of Homeland Security is underway with 
authorization by Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 (Bush 2003). The 
draft National Response Plan (NRP) (United States Department of Homeland 
Security 2003a) and National Incident Management System (NIMS) (United 
States Department of Homeland Security 2003b). As drafted, these programs 
effectively give sweeping authorities to the Department of Homeland Security to 
review vulnerability assessments and manage any emergency incident under the 
auspices of national security while shielding nearly all related information and 
activities from public oversight or involvement. The documents remain in draft 
form and are undergoing extensive review and comment by numerous agencies. 
Summary of Regulatory Review 
Extensive volumes of regulations, assessments and pending programs aside, 
governmental controls in the risk assessment and planning process at best 
provide a framework. Few if any operational details are provided for the 
regulated and affected community, and they are left to their own devices to 
construct the appropriate controls and checks, what many respondents referred 
to in Chapters 5 and 6 of this study as "filling in the blanks." Presumably, this is a 
better alternative than having regulators attempt to devise comprehensive "how-
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to" approaches that attempt to be all things to all users, unlikely to be feasible 
even if desired. However, the process of filling in the blanks as examined in this 
study is precisely where the vulnerabilities to organizational deviance as 
discussed in Chapter 3 occur. In summary, the current mix of regulations, 
pending legislation and shielded information has effectively created a risk 
management honor system of near complete reliance on experts, insiders and 
contingency plans. This encourages a paternal management approach that 
promotes misplaced confidence and decreased vigilance, raising serious issues 
regarding oversight of programs, risk management, safety and public confidence. 
Such a one-sided process only reinforces the need for thorough analysis and 
understanding of the relationship between risk perception and worst-case 
contingency planning at the level of the individual insider and the role of this 
relationship in the organizational output of the process. 
CHAPTER 3: REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE 
Introduction 
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The purpose of the literature review is to provide context and background 
information on issues and concepts relevant to the proposed research questions. 
First, how do insiders perceive risk and define worst-case scenarios? Second, 
how does risk perception drive contingency planning? Vulnerability to 
catastrophic events might appear to be a simple matter of good management 
practices, advanced technology, security or lack thereof. However, researcher 
experience and examination of literature dealing with characteristics of 
organizations imply a more complicated picture wherein risk management is not 
adequately evaluated strictly in terms of simple human error or probabilities of 
failure. Organizations are much more complex than just an assembly of like-
minded employees operating in unison to achieve some common goal, and it is 
the interaction and outputs of this dynamic environment that are of interest to the 
researcher. While psychologists tend to treat risk as an individual decision, 
within organizations it tends to be treated as a social construct, with the role or 
opinion of individuals essentially rendered irrelevant, as reflected in this study. 
The review of literature examines organizational practices that influence risk 
perception and create risk and subsequently vulnerability to disaster. That 
information is grouped into four themes that illustrate the selected literature: Risk 
Perceptions and Individual Behavior, Problems with Situation Normal; The Myth 
of Low Risk, and The Myth of Emergency Preparedness. The chapter concludes 
with Summary of Literature Review, which briefly summarizes and relates the 
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literature and themes and identifies a specific gap in the literature into which this 
research extends. 
Risk Perception and Individual Behavior 
Many theories of health behavior speculate that risk judgments play a major role 
in behavior, and that a self-generated perception of invincibility to harm is 
responsible for willing engagement in risky behavior. These theories generally 
assume that with no negative outcomes experienced people engaging in risky 
behavior have a lower risk judgment than non-engagers. 
Contrary to prevailing theory Halpern-Felsher et al. (2001) found that 
among participants reporting having experienced negative outcomes for events 
including natural disasters such as earthquakes, there were no significant 
differences regarding relative risk judgments compared to those who had not. 
Furthermore, participants reporting a negative outcome experience with the 
hazard rated the chance of future negative outcomes as lower than participants 
with no such experience. Regarding all of the risky behaviors and events rated 
by participants, risk judgments by engagers were lower than judgments of non-
engagers. To explain these seemingly counterintuitive findings, the researchers 
note that many behavioral intervention programs focus on health risks and 
emphasize the probability that risky behavior almost certainly will lead to a 
negative outcome. So framed, it is not unexpected then that individuals with no 
direct experience may believe firmly that the link between behavior and outcome 
is very strong, judging risks from such events or behavior as high. However, 
having engaged in the behavior or experienced the event with minimal or no 
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negative outcomes (i.e., no injuries, no significant losses) these individuals 
reassess the "real" risk as lower than originally presented. Thus, perceptions of 
risk may not motivate behavior, as commonly thought, but rather may reflect 
experience. This theory has a direct implication in the consideration of risk as 
addressed in the current study, specifically as it may relate to risk disqualification 
(Clarke 1993) and political sense making (Gephart 1984; Gephart 2004). If 
individuals and organizations consistently engage in risky behavior with few or no 
negative outcomes, this might help explain why organizations tend to judge that 
risk as low when others, such as planners with less or no direct experience might 
judge the same risk as high. 
Weinstein and Klein (1995) noted that people tend to be unrealistically 
optimistic and claim that they are less likely than their peers to suffer harm. 
Going beyond common rationales such as inaccurate information or cognitive 
errors, the researchers propose that individuals are also motivated to avoid 
anxiety and maintain self-esteem, making them resistant to change. In effect, 
people tend to overestimate positive, enhancing actions taken by themselves and 
minimize those taken by others. This phenomenon seems consistent with 
participant comments made in the current study regarding the risks posed to 
others by various respondents, particularly regarding worst-case scenarios and 
response to events at other facilities. Although organizations may not typically 
be described as being concerned with anxiety and self-esteem, equivalent 
characteristics could certainly be competitiveness, public image and being a 
good corporate neighbor. The authors note several studies showing that 
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generating reasons why certain outcomes might occur or constructing scenarios 
that might lead to a specific outcome increases the perceived likelihood that the 
event will actually take place. This observation seems relevant to the current 
study particularly in the construction and consideration of specified worst-case 
scenarios and the risks posed to responders and citizens. Scenarios must be 
constructed to be considered, and as the researcher later concludes this is both 
the single most important and most vulnerable step in the risk management 
process. Whether disqualification of any given threat or risk is legitimate is a 
critical issue, since Weinstein and Klein (1995) conclude that their efforts to 
reduce optimistic biases regarding health hazards were unsuccessful, finding that 
biases may actually have been exaggerated by the attention focused on the 
hazards. As discussed, it may be the case that participants simply do not see 
themselves as vulnerable and prefer to take little or no protective action. 
Norris (1997) found an opposing result, concluding that although the 
illusion of invulnerability is well documented, precautionary behavior is 
paradoxically common. The rationale for this seems to be participant beliefs that 
tragedy and misfortune are preventable or controllable and that one's chances of 
becoming a victim depend greatly on what one does to protect oneself, including 
dealing with environmental threats. However, he found that protective behavi.ors 
were not consistent and are a complex function of perceived risk, beliefs about 
the effectiveness of the protective actions, beliefs about one's own ability to 
perform the behavior and beliefs that others expect them to act or not. This has 
implications for the current research in that many respondents described citizens 
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as generally uninterested and nonresponsive regarding environmental threats, 
relegating them simply to taking action as told to do so by responders or media 
warnings. Thus as they see the situation the uninterested public may actually be 
as prepared as they care to be. Without meaningful interaction there is no way to 
know what they think or why they are thinking it. Engaging this population will be 
explored as a part of the discussion of implications and future research in the 
current study. 
In another interpretation of the relationship between risk perception and 
behavior Weinstein and Nicolich (1993) propose that many investigators use 
designs inappropriate for the hypotheses tested or look at incorrect correlations 
to answer the research questions. Aside from whether "behavior" means current 
or changed from one study to the next, they see the effects of time and barriers 
on behavior as critical variables not typically considered. Once a hazard 
becomes apparent or a new precaution becomes available, some people will 
likely act to reduce their risk. Others may not, and that lack of action may be due 
to preventive barriers rather than overt disregard. In those cases the correlation 
between high risk perception and protective action will be very low and no longer 
implies that the person will take action. Having not considered the presence of 
barriers to action or the effects of time on perception, the lack of correlation might 
be misinterpreted as simple disregard. Over time and given the removal of 
barriers, people tend to behave in a manner consistent with their perceptions of 
the risk. An important point in this is the general assumption that when people 
adopt precautions, they perceive their risk to have been lowered. The implication 
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of these obseNations for the current research relates to the inclusion of barriers 
and time in understanding the perceptions of risk among both respondents and 
other stakeholders, particularly those living near the chemical facilities. There 
are obvious environmental justice implications here, in that barriers to taking 
protective action may be as simple as the inability to move. Others may have 
adjusted their perception of risk over time and accepted it as low based on 
perceptions of lack of negative experience, strength of the planning programs in 
place and reassurances from facility or planning personnel. The apparent lack of 
protective actions might in these cases be taken as a measure of confidence, but 
not as a result of meaningful, informed discourse. The stakeholder outreach 
program recommended by the researcher would go far in correcting this. 
Other researchers (Fischhoff et al. 1978; Slovic, Fischhoff and 
Lichtenstein 1984; Slovic and Weber 2002) have found that environmental risk 
perception among individuals is not ambiguous at all, particularly regarding low 
probability/high consequence (LPHC) events such as those referenced in the 
current study. Consequence matters more than probability due to the influence 
of psychometric characteristics such as dread, voluntariness, knowledge, 
controllability and benefit. Participants with low familiarity with the hazard tended 
to report higher risk judgment, while those with greater familiarity judged risk to 
be lower. In that research, experience consistently reduced the perception of 
risk. 
Baum and Fleming (1993) propose that application of behavioral research 
and theory to the issue of toxic hazards is both timely and relevant, obseNing 
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that regardless of the level of sophistication or oversight, technology poses 
hazards that have simply displaced the threats they sought to eliminate. 
Breakdown of systems are described as unexpected, complex and of low 
probability, but almost certain to happen, consistent with their reference theory of 
"normal accidents" (Perrow 1999). 
With apparent heightened public concern about serious events such as 
nuclear accidents, failed toxic waste landfills and chemical mishaps has come an 
increase in stress over the uncontrollability and effects on exposed populations. 
Whether this chronic stress and the related psychological consequences can be 
reliably assessed or even should be considered in the overall impact of an event 
remains controversial. However, the authors propose that such events share 
common characteristics, responses are broadly similar and that measurement of 
such is both possible and beneficial to planners, managers and lawmakers. 
They subscribe to the notion that technological disasters are different than 
natural disasters and are more likely to cause long-term stress and concern. The 
primary reason for this difference is not the duration or even the severity of the 
event, but rather the cause, which is generally perceived to involve human error 
or culpability, loss of control and violations of expectations of control, all what 
Freudenburg (1993) described as recreancy. Implications of their research 
relevant to the current study are numerous. First, quantifying risk is extremely 
difficult, even though it is a central part of a variety of environmental activities. 
The effects of stress, not just direct losses, should be considered in those 
estimates. This is particularly relevant to the researcher's recommendation that 
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more accurate risk assessment tools be developed to promote a more consistent 
approach and a more universal stakeholder vocabulary. Second, public opinion 
influences policy. An engaged, well-informed constituency will demand that 
prioritization, distribution and management of risk be based on the entire scope 
of hazards, including mental and physical health and quality of life. This has 
obvious environmental justice implications. Third, the claimed inevitability of 
accidents makes proper management and understanding of them a top priority 
for all stakeholders, particularly State and Federal agencies charged with 
oversight of such facilities. These agencies need to identify and close gaps in 
existing abilities to do so, as described in the current study. Fourth, the overall 
issue is not simply the expansion of the study of toxic exposures. Rather it is the 
need for an integrated approached regarding intervention, assessment, response 
and resolving conflicts between safety and standard of living. 
Weyman and Clarke (2003) describe a shift from the traditional notions of 
objective versus subjective risk, both rejected as sole explanations of the proper 
treatment of risk, to a more complex view that involves cognitive, social and 
cultural influences. Their examination of the effects of organizational roles on 
risk perception among coal miners in high-hazard deep mining offers relevant 
insights for the current study. First, they describe widespread acceptance that 
accident data provide the most available insight into risk potential. While this 
may be a common practice, accident rates are in reality merely an indication of 
risk outcomes and are influenced by many factors. As such, they should not be 
held up as an absolute measure of risk potential, particularly in examinations of 
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low frequency, high magnitude events. However, it is precisely the tendency to 
do so that is described in numerous sociological theories of organizational 
deviance. Sense making (Gephart 1984; Gephart 2004), defining acceptable risk 
(Clarke 1988), risk disqualification (Clarke 1993) and the use of fantasy 
documents (Clarke 1999), all imply safety and contribute to the myth of low risk 
based on a claimed lack of major events. Second, worker perceptions of risk 
were judged reasonably accurate. This is obviously relevant to the process of 
risk evaluation since that function falls to the insider group as defined by the 
current research. Third, workers closest to the production areas rated risks as 
high, while senior managers and others removed from front-line process areas 
rated risks as low. In effect, direct experience with the risks results in the 
perception of increased risk. This seems consistent with the findings of the 
current study regarding Environmental, Health and Safety Managers, none of 
which function as front-line workers, who as a group tended to describe their 
facilities as low risk and not realistically vulnerable to worst-case scenarios. As 
discussed previously in this literature review, other research contradicts that 
position, namely Halpern-Felsher et al. (2001) who found that risk judgments by 
engagers (i.e., closer to the production) were lower than judgments of non-
engagers. Were that the case, one would expect workers inside the participant 
chemical facilities to judge risk as even lower than their managers. In either 
case, the accuracy of these perceptions becomes an issue. Future study would 
be required to determine whether front-line chemical facility worker views support 
either of these theories. Fourth, given that those closest to the risk seem to have 
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the greatest awareness of it, then risk taking by these individuals is likely not the 
result of ignorance, lack of insight or lack of risk appreciation. Instead, it implies 
that the basis for risk taking lies beyond the individual and implicates the setting 
and culture in which the individuals operate, which is precisely the focus of the 
sociological theories of organizational deviance that form the foundation of the 
current research. 
Problems with Situation Normal 
Turner (1976) evaluated certain incidents where post-incident investigation found 
that the tragedies were in fact predictable and even expected, finding common 
characteristics of ignoring the possibility of disaster; paying attention to nuisance 
problems and none to larger background issues; ignoring outside complaints; 
ambiguous, vague or complex information; over-reliance on subcontractors; 
failure to comply with ·· regulations; and ignoring warning signs. These 
characteristics constitute "the incubation stage in a sequence of disaster 
development, accumulating unnoticed until a precipitating event leads to the 
onset of the disaster'' (p. 378), with the collective effect described as "failures of 
foresight" (p. 378). This is found to be a recurring theme throughout the current 
study, and the researcher will provide additional discussion of how this theory 
relates to other significant influences. 
Following the 1986 Challenger loss, Vaughan (1999) found "routine 
nonconformity, mistake, misconduct, and disaster systematically produced by the 
interconnection between environment, organizations, cognition, and choice" (p. 
271 ). Power struggles, goal displacement, cumbersome procedures, high levels 
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of centralization, competitive environments, structural secrecy, extreme rule-
mindedness, mistakes, lack of accountability, conflicts of interest and overt 
misconduct were identified as components in degrading the organization's 
mission. Although each of these factors played a part, the decision to launch 
was actually detailed, well documented and eventually made with Launch Team 
consensus. No amount of planning, prediction or consensus could overcome the 
structural secrecy inhibiting the free flow of data and concerns, nor could it 
anticipate environmental and political influences on the process. Competition, 
tightening of budgets and hidden agendas conflicted with safety as the main 
priority, particularly in this technical, hard-to-manage system (Vaughan 1992; 
Vaughan 1996). 
Meyer and Rowan (1991) found that organizations use structure to gain 
legitimacy while in reality conformity to institutionalized rules often conflicts 
sharply with requirements for efficiency, leading to claimed practices that differ 
from actual operating practices. Structure decouples from activity, and in such 
an environment managers spend far too much time on rituals, myths and abstract 
structures, generating deviant outcomes from rule violations, unimplemented 
decisions, problematic technologies and subverted or vague evaluation and 
inspection systems. Several respondents make a point of discussing facilities at 
which this seems clearly to be the case. Apparently, some organizations are 
comfortable with contingency plans that overstate their capabilities, preferring to 
benefit from the apparent legitimacy and not address the obvious implications of 
potential or eventual plan failure. 
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Perrow (1999) takes an opposing view to disaster by deviance, instead 
describing accidents as normal outputs of complex systems effectively doomed 
to fail because of inherent human and mechanical error. His model couples 
complexity with probability and severity of failure, dividing systems based on 
linear or complex interactions. Presumably, failures (disasters) in complex 
systems result from unknown interactions, cannot be foreseen and can be 
analyzed and understood only in hindsight. In effect it is the uncontrollable 
system that poses the real danger, not the individual components. This theory is 
strongly embraced by many researchers in the field of psychology, particularly 
those involved in the study of stress, preparedness, risk judgment and risk 
. behaviors. Relevant pieces are discussed earlier in this review. 
Whether by deviance or design, it is apparent that organizations create 
and institutionalize risk as part of day-to-day "situation normal" activities. 
Accidents are socialized as a cost of doing business and remain seen as rare, 
unexpected events, perpetuating the myth of low risk. Specific theories of 
organizational deviance are clearly operating in this insider system. 
The Myth of Low Risk 
Janis (1972) proposed that organizations frequently become "victims of 
groupthink" (p.197) when considering high-risk issues. Several characteristics of 
this phenomenon fall in line with other sociological theories, all of which 
contribute to the myth of low risk. In a groupthink environment, members share 
an illusion of invulnerability that encourages excessive optimism and risk taking. 
Discounting of warnings is rationalized and the group tends to display an 
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unquestioned belief in their own inherent morality. Dissent is unacceptable and 
results in sanctions. These cognitive afflictions may be a mutual effort by the 
group to maintain self-esteem, particularly when they share responsibility for 
decisions that might incur social or self-disapproval. With internal reassurances, 
group members build up mutual confidence and are reassured about unfamiliar 
risks without pursuing any serious consideration of alternative courses of action. 
Gephart (1984) describes organizationally based environmental disasters 
(OBEDs) involving adverse effects from exploitation of ecosystem resources. 
Although these cumulative, socially based disasters result from managerial 
activity and are often featured in news reports, they are largely absent from 
disaster literature. This is explained as a function of the regulative management 
of resources for maximum rewards and a self-perceived human exemption from 
ecological constraints based on discovering and controlling laws applicable to 
reality and discovering and implementing new technology as needed to 
overcome constraints or impacts. OBEDs are difficult to conceptualize due to the 
lack of quantitative methods of analysis to capture the complexities of these 
situations and the intricate causes, histories, and consequences that produce 
them. These characteristics are consistent with both the "failures of foresight" 
(Turner 1976) and "fantasy document" (Clarke and Perrow 1996) views, though 
Gephart clearly favors Perrow's "normal accidents" view (Perrow 1999). Parties 
interested in the preservation of business have a stake in construing accidents as 
"unanticipated, rare, and which no reasonable precaution could prevent" (p. 211 ), 
thus avoiding liability and loss of support. From this, Gephart proposes a theory 
RISK PERCEPTION 29 
of "political sense making" (p. 212), suggesting that contradictory views of the 
world compete, but organized capital eventually dominates by relying on science 
to minimize perceived risk. Consequently, society and industry normalize the 
processes and outcomes, including disasters, as unavoidable costs of doing 
business. 
In more recent work, Gephart (2004) continues his examination of the role 
of sense making in the social construction of risk, reiterating his strong support of 
"normal accidents" (Perrow 1999). As sense making involves an attempt to 
reconcile differing views of the world, power then equates to having the desired 
account of reality prevail over competing accounts. Organizations apparently 
influence sense making about the environment and are thus able to develop and 
implement risky technology while ignoring or externalizing costs and effects onto 
other groups. This is primarily accomplished through three mechanisms. First, 
technology designs serve the needs of stakeholders focused on organizational 
goals and rewards. Having developed complex, intrinsically flawed systems 
future errors are inevitably assigned to operators, in keeping with Perrow's 
(1999) notion of "normal accidents." Second, extensive reliance on fantasy 
documents and risk assessments (Clark and Perrow 1996) provides an apparent 
promise of effective control and response. Opposition to risky technology simply 
drives the process to be even more reliant of these plans. Third, agencies and 
institutions face a loss of legitimacy following technology failure or disasters and 
inevitably conduct inquiries that tend to assign fault to operators. Agency 
controls are shown to have been adequate but not followed by the faulty 
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operators, and recommendations for future action focus on correcting those 
issues, not the technology itself. In that way organizations and risky technologies 
are legitimated even though they have failed. Key observations in this work are 
that "micro-level sense making practices produce macro-level phenomena" (p. 
25) and that "power lies in mundane features of human communication" (p. 25). 
This power operates each time that world views compete. 
Clarke and Short (1993) examined theories of trust, fairness, expert 
opinion and other factors in the social construction of definitions of risk, finding 
that organizations normally have too much information rather than not enough 
and that the greatest influences on social policy come from interest groups, not 
the public. They evaluate Perrow's "normal accidents" model (Perrow 1999) and 
the tendency to use human error as a primary cause of failure, finding that the 
value of "normal accidents" is the assignment of organizational fault, dismissing 
"human error" excuses as denials of systemic failures. 
Freudenburg (1993) noted that with division of labor have come 
specialization and a much lower risk of death. However, labor grows more 
complex, forcing people to depend on others "performing the necessary 
calculations" (p. 913). This dependency on others has lead to higher 
probabilities that some "key portions of the system" (p. 914) cannot safely be 
counted upon to perform as needed, making us more vulnerable. He chooses 
the term "recreancy'' to describe this institutional "failure to follow through on a 
duty or trust" (p. 916), emphasizing that the use of this term is subject to the 
points of view of the participants and is directly related to the level of concern 
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about the issue and effects. The point is illustrated by comparing the reaction to 
natural disasters, where a "therapeutic community'' (p. 928) emerges, pulls 
together and restores confidence in officials and community, to that of a 
technological disaster, where a "corrosive community" (p. 928) leads to distrust, 
estrangement and a realization that the system cannot perform as promised. 
Vulnerability to recreancy is a commonly expressed concern among Local 
Emergency Responders in the current study, particularly as related to reliance on 
contingency plans during responses at chemical facilities.· 
Clarke (1988) evaluated the process through which social actors make 
choices among risks, finding that traditional measures of risk assessment imply 
that the public defines "acceptable risk" when in reality it is almost always the 
organization. The result is a risk analysis weighing power, not risk. The 
tendency to treat risk assessment as a scientific issue and risk acceptability as 
political is a major source of conflict. Many respondents described exactly this 
conflict, particularly when debating worst-case scenarios and trying to define 
"realistic." In the end, they report that the organization authoring the contingency 
plans generally if not always prevaiL 
Clarke (1993) reviewed the Exxon Valdez incident in light of a 
"disqualification heuristic" that leads organizations to misperceive risk. Even with 
five approved contingency plans in effect to address potential oil spill incidents, 
each was found to be general and addressed relatively minor events under ideal 
conditions for weather and preparedness since events deemed unlikely (large 
spills, bad conditions) were disregarded. In negotiations with regulatory 
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agencies, Exxon eventually claimed the position of framing the scenarios and 
assigning risk so that the probability of large spills was considered so remote as 
not to be included in the talks. Another key factor in planning failures is too much 
available information coupled with convictions that processes are safe and that 
all incidents can be controlled. In that context, risk shortcuts are taken and risk 
perception does not reflect scientifically assessed risk, allowing decision-makers 
to protect themselves from seriously considering the likelihood of disasters and 
preserving resources by constructing outcomes that avoid extensive response 
preparedness. The heuristic is fostered by informational dependencies and 
power struggles between regulators and organizations that regulators inevitably 
lose, dependency on the organization to provide data, intense production 
pressure, disciplinary specialization that relies heavily on assumptions about the 
process, and the degree of outside scrutiny brought to bear. As the researcher 
expected, this heuristic was found to be the predominant influence in the risk 
management process, primarily due to the impact on the initial framing of risk 
scenarios to be considered. 
This organizational tendency to underestimate or disregard risk simplifies 
the process of controlling it, making "adequate" planning and preparedness a 
certainty. As contingency plans are institutionalized, confidence in the ability to 
manage all hazards with minimal cost and effort grows, perpetuating the myth of 
emergency preparedness. 
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The Myth of Emergency Preparedness 
Clarke and Short (1993) found a paradox in relying on organizations to respond 
to accidents since organizations base planning and expectations of success on 
scant past experience, institutionalizing the plans and misplaced confidence that 
follows. Subsequently, the perception and discussions of risk are based in public 
relations. Failure of contingency plans and response teams to perform as 
promised is actually normal and "we should be surprised when organizations do 
respond well" (p. 394). Related to this, Clarke and Perrow (1996) examined the 
symbolism of organizational response and contingency plans used to justify 
themselves to others by demonstrating that high-risk systems pose little or no 
risk to society. They found that such "fantasy documents" (p. 1040) are "based 
on sparse or nonexistent experience, and that they are often wildly unrealistic" (p. 
1040). Coming to believe in these plans, organizations ignore the reality that not 
all will go well in an emergency and that conditions and performance of support 
groups will be far less than predicted. In the current study, many respondents 
aside from facility Environmental, Health and Safety Managers echoed this, 
many from direct experience. Failure of the plans and the response resources 
remains a primary concern for responders and regulators. 
Clarke (1999) examined the reasons why organizations develop and rely 
on "fantasy documents" (p. 136) that will almost certainly fail, concluding that the 
plans are not lies or deliberate deceptions, but exercises in self-deception 
generated by managers doing what they are supposed to do: bring order and 
control to a process and put unknown issues into familiar terms. Such 
RISK PERCEPTION 34 
documents are based almost entirely on predictions influenced by social and 
organizational forces including the relationship with the intended audience. By 
not being a lie, the fantasy is even harder to evaluate or contradict since the 
organization and the experts believe the plan and actively support it. A strong 
contributing factor is the fundamental business expectation that no problem is 
unsolvable and no process uncontrollable. The effect of such plans is to 
influence the audience into concluding that experts have considered and 
analyzed every relevant contingency despite the lack of direct experience. The 
audience in most cases is said to be the public--in reality, regulatory agencies--
and these documents represent a power struggle between the parties. Assigning 
accidents the special status of being unexpected and rare hides the reality that 
they are normal and routine. Thus, plans become undeseNed symbols of 
competence that lead society to normalize risk and the results, shielding elites 
and organizations from responsibility and actually increasing risk by decreasing 
vigilance. As protection for planners, "those who would criticize the fantasizers 
are, by default, extremists" (p. 167) and are ruled out as irrelevant to the 
discussions. Clarke (1999) speculates that, although unlikely ever to happen, 
"society would be safer, smarter and fairer if our organizations and their masters 
could admit their limitations, declaring frankly that they cannot control the 
uncontrollable" (p. 171 ). As with many of the theories examined in the current 
study, facility and outside respondents were sharply divided over this point. 
Offsite respondents seemed clearly to see this as a major issue, while facility 
managers effectively dismissed it. 
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Summary of Literature Review 
Perceptions of risk may not motivate behavior, as commonly thought, but rather 
may reflect experience. If individuals and organizations consistently engage in 
risky behavior with few or no negative outcomes, this might help explain why 
organizations tend to judge that risk as low when others, such as planners with 
less or no direct experience might judge the same risk as high. 
Researchers are divided over whether individuals simply do not see 
themselves as vulnerable and prefer to take little or no protective action, or 
instead whether precautionary behavior is paradoxically common since 
individuals believe that tragedy and misfortune are preventable or controllable 
and that one's chances of becoming a victim depend greatly on what one does to 
protect oneself, including dealing with environmental threats. In either case, it 
appears that over time and given the removal of barriers, people tend to behave 
in a manner consistent with their perceptions of the risk. 
An important assumption is that when people adopt precautions, they 
perceive their risk to have been lowered. · This likely includes reliance on 
planners and emergency responders as one, if not the only, precaution available 
to proximal residents. The roles, motivations and reactions of individuals remain 
unclear and at times contradicted by various research, but future management of 
risk must recognize the need to go beyond the measurement of risk as simply a 
direct loss or toxic exposure. Quality of life and competing world views are 
involved and must be taken into account, even if problematic. A major 
contribution of the psychological research on this topic is the recognition that the 
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basis for risk taking lies beyond the individual, implicating the setting and culture 
within which the individual operates. This implication is the focus of the 
sociological theories of organizational deviance that form the foundation of this 
research study. 
With some disagreement over disasters as either inevitable or as 
foreseeable and preventable, the open literature clearly establishes the role of 
organizational deviance in· disaster through disqualifying and underestimating 
risk; avoiding commitment of resources; political power struggles; illusions of low 
risk and emergency preparedness; and reliance on complex, symbolic 
contingency plans doomed to failure. These "situation normal" organizational 
characteristics create misplaced confidence that leads actors and society to rely 
on what are in reality myths of low risk and emergency preparedness, effectively 
decreasing vigilance and increasing risk. The current regulatory structure offers 
little relief, with near complete reliance on information generated by experts and 
insiders, and public oversight and access to information severely restricted. As 
will be seen in the data analysis and conclusions, these myths and conflicts are 
clearly in play within the insider group interviewed for this study. Respondents 
tended to have strong, often competing opinions regarding the sources and 
effects of the risk management process failures, and the literature reviewed here 
fairly describes these conflicts and provided a strong foundation for the research. 
Although key figures in the risk management process, within the open 
literature there had previously been no examination of the self-reported views 
and roles of risk management insiders in defining and addressing risk from 
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potential worst-case events at chemical facilities. In conducting this study, the 
researcher sought to make an intellectual contribution by extending the existing 
body of work on organizational deviance, risk and disaster to this new area of 
inquiry. Following this insider examination and having examined the two 
research questions that form the basis of the current study, the researcher 
proposes that several existing theories are now clearly confirmed and put into a 
clear, unique perspective. 
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CHAPTER 4: SCOPE AND METHODS 
Introduction 
This chapter addresses: research design; instrument development; participants; 
sample selection; informed consent; initial interviews; follow-up interviews; ethical 
considerations; confidentiality; Institutional Review Board Approval; data analysis 
and coding; document analysis; triangulation; generalizability; and the 
appropriateness of each, concluding with a discussion of assumptions and 
limitations. 
Research Design 
This study focused on two specific research questions. First, how do insiders 
perceive risk and define worst-case scenarios? Second, how does risk 
perception drive contingency planning? To examine this topic intimately and 
collect the rich data desired, a basic interpretive qualitative design based on 
direct interaction and extended dialogue with the participants was appropriate. 
Partially structured interviews provided an excellent mechanism by which to 
collect the necessary data within each participant's operating environment. Core 
open-ended questions were formulated in advance, order of presentation was 
flexible, added or modified questions were used and the interviewer requested 
consent to record responses verbatim using an audio tape recorder. The 
" 
probability of deep, rich and spontaneous conversations made this method 
effective for both the primary and follow-up interviews. 
In the event that individual participants did not wish to be recorded, the 
interviewer captured the essence of responses in written notes and jottings, a 
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technique typically used in semistructured interviews (Gay and Airasian 2000). 
The effect of note taking on interviews and data accuracy was minimal since the 
participants tended to provide very succinct answers and rarely elaborated or 
strayed from the specific question. In the case of the LERs, this was explained 
as largely a function of having learned to communicate via radio, where brevity 
and clarity are assets. This was group of few words. For the larger group, the 
researcher is confident that vigilance and political risk aversion were driving 
factors. In either case, by no means are these fraternal risk managers a "chatty" 
group. Still, the answers were candid and illustrative. 
Regarding other potential data collection methods: observation was 
neither feasible nor adequate; totally structured and structured interviews would 
allow no capture of context or deeper meaning, confining answers to pre-
selected, easily analyzed choices; and unstructured interviews would not provide 
the consistency needed for group data collection on the specific research 
questions. Future research on this topic might incorporate any or all of these 
methods as appropriate based on the specific focus and setting. 
Instrument Development 
Risk perception data are typically collected by interviews or surveys based on 
affective, self-report instruments using Likert Scales, Psychometrics (i.e., 
evaluation of dread, imposition, familiarity and controllability heuristics), concept 
mapping or mental modeling. An extensive review of sources of test information, 
including Mental Measurements Yearbooks, Tests in Print, Pro-Ed Publications 
and the Educational Testing Service (ETS) Test Collection Database, revealed 
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no existing instruments suitable for use in this research. Consequently, a 
project-specific instrument was developed. The instrument was open-ended in 
that core questions were predetermined, but answers were generated by the 
respondents. 
Participants 
Volunteer participants were drawn from within a major metropolitan area found in 
the Southwestern United States and the USEPA Regional Office with jurisdiction 
over that area. The city has a population of over 500,000 (United States Census 
Bureau 2000) and supports a well-developed industrial base. Typical sites 
include large, complex chemical facilities such as petrochemical refining and 
associated storage capacity, chemical manufacturing and reaction, water and 
wastewater treatment and related transportation systems such as pipelines, rail 
and interstate. There is virtually no limit to the type of chemicals that may be in 
process, storage or transit within these areas at any given time. Typical 
chemicals of concern include: flammables such as solvents, fuels and 
compressed gases; toxics such as chlorine and anhydrous ammonia; and volatile 
acids such as hydrochloric, hydrofluoric and sulfuric. Inventories of each may 
reach billions of pounds per site with worst-case significant offsite consequences 
measured in miles, potentially affecting hundreds of thousands or even millions 
of people. 
Participants were purposefully sampled to represent three distinct 
information rich populations: facility Environmental, Health and Safety (EHS) 
Managers; State and Federal On-Scene Coordinators (OSCs); and Local 
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Emergency Responders (LERs). Facility Environmental, Health and Safety 
Managers are responsible for risk and consequence analyses relevant to the 
particular hazards associated with their respective operations and development 
and implementation of contingency plans in compliance with regulatory and 
corporate mandates. 
On-Scene Coordinators are emergency management representatives of 
the relevant State and the USEPA and respond to reported or threatened 
releases that require State and/or Federal intervention, either by statute or by 
request from the affected facility or jurisdiction. Another large component of their 
responsibilities is pre-planning for such events with those affected jurisdictions 
and facilities. 
Local Emergency Responders include Hazardous Materials Teams 
(Hazmat) and Local Emergency Planning Committees. These personnel operate 
at a local level and have a great degree of familiarity with their respective 
facilities and associated hazards. Collectively these participants are referred to 
in this research as "insiders." It is within this group that risk from chemical 
facilities is framed, debated and eventually defined and addressed. That process 
forms the basis for agency and community emergency preparedness. As the 
insider group was the focus of this research, offsite populations and other non-
insiders were not included as participants. 
Sample Selection 
The researcher conducted initial and in some cases follow-up interviews of 20 
volunteer participants. Specifically the sample group was made up of six facility 
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Environmental, Health and Safety Managers, seven Local Emergency 
Responders and two State and five Federal On-Scene Coordinators. One senior 
Environmental, Health and Safety Manager was interviewed at each facility. 
Those managers represent the best possible sample of the 17 facilities in the 
study area with the greatest potential offsite impacts based on self-reported Risk 
Management Program Offsite Consequence Analysis data. The original goal 
was to interview the top six, however some facility representatives were 
unavailable or declined to participate. Greatest-impact facilities were preferred 
since these operations have the potential to affect the greatest number of people 
and consequently are the object of a proportionately increased amount and 
intensity of planning both internally and with external agencies. Due to increased 
planning requirements, these facilities were expected to have greater issue 
awareness, robust contingency plans, mature training and response programs 
and increased interaction with local Emergency Responders and Planners. 
Local Emergency Responders were selected and interviewed based on 
purposeful and snowball sampling and self-reported planning and response 
experience, representing a good combination of Hazmat and Local Emergency 
Planning Committee personnel. While Local Emergency Responders serve 
exclusively within their respective cities, On-Scene Coordinators work within a 
State or multi-state region and are not assigned solely to specific cities or areas. 
For those interviews, the researcher selected On-Scene Coordinators based on 
purposeful and snowball sampling and the most extensive self-reported planning 
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and response interaction, experience and knowledge regarding the metropolitan 
area of interest. 
Informed Consent 
The researcher secured fully informed consent from each participant by use of a 
detailed instrument based on current Oklahoma State University Institutional 
Review Board (IRB) requirements (Oklahoma State University 2002). That 
instrument, titled "Informed Consent Letter for Adult Participants," is found in 
Appendix A. The consent letter was sent to the respective participant in advance 
of each interview and reviewed again with the participant during the introductory 
meeting, with specific and adequate attention paid to the topic of confidentiality. 
Initial Interviews 
The researcher contacted each participant by telephone to schedule an 
appointment, location and adequate time for the interview. Once onsite the 
researcher presented a general introduction and overview, reconfirmed consent 
and conducted the interview. Interview questions were grouped into two 
categories, risk perception and contingency planning, and administered using the 
core questions from the Interview Protocol found in Appendix B. At the 
conclusion of each interview, the researcher conducted a debriefing to discuss 
questions or concerns and provided copies of notes to the participant. During 
this debriefing, the researcher requested a participant review of data to solicit 
feedback regarding accuracy and completeness, particularly regarding quoted 
statements. To preserve complete confidentiality and encourage free and open 
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dialogue, interviews were conducted individually, with no discussion or 
confirmation by the researcher of identities or responses of other participants. 
Follow-up Interviews 
It was anticipated that the initial data review would identify gaps in the data and 
generate insightful follow-up questions. In only a few cases, the researcher 
needed to contact participants by telephone to ask additional questions and to 
gain clarification of original interview content. Each follow-up interview was 
concluded by a debriefing and verbal participant review of the collected 
information and notes. The limited number of follow-up interviews is attributed to 
both the researcher's increasing competency gained from the interview 
experiences and the previously discussed tendency for the participants to 
provide pointed, succinct answers. 
On Being an Insider in a Study of Insiders 
This qualitative inquiry posed specific challenges in that the researcher had direct 
interaction with the participants and was attempting to get them to open up and 
speak frankly and truthfully. Such interaction necessarily results in some amount 
of "resocialization" (Emerson, Fretz and Shaw 1995:2), creating a need for trust 
on both sides and imparting a degree of intimacy between the two. 
Ethical considerations faced by qualitative researchers are many and 
include, but are not limited to: building trust and confidence; strict use of informed 
consent and confidentiality safeguards; minimizing psychological or physical risks 
to the participants; legal liabilities; political repercussions; gathering data without 
creating or changing it; data access and ownership; data collection boundaries; 
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compensation; dealing with confessions or observations or revelations of illegal 
activities; and the temptation to use deception to gather "good" data (Gay and 
Airasian 2000; Patton 2002). This study was no different. As qualitative 
interactions are by nature emergent and somewhat spontaneous, many of these 
issues surfaced at various points in the interviews. Immersion in the setting and 
increased understanding could easily have created unanticipated conflicts of 
interest or obvious areas of relevant follow-up questioning that were not part of 
the original instrument, Institutional Review Board approval or even the design 
(Gay and Airasian 2000; Merriam 2002). The researcher had to remain 
cognizant of his role as a student researcher and restrict questions and probing 
to only those data relevant to the current study. Each relevant ethical 
consideration was considered in all steps of this research project and, whatever 
the potential research gains or dramatic revelations, the overriding goal in every 
case was the well-being of participants and their right to be fully informed and 
protected. 
The researcher's current affiliation with the USEPA as a Federal On-
Scene Coordinator, strong knowledge of the topic and relationships with many of 
the potential participants posed a particular challenge. The researcher knows 
these people, places and topics well enough to instill a high level of trust, 
confidence and knowledge, all of which contributed to quality research. Within or 
outside of a research setting, especially with "just the guys talking," that level of 
intimacy might very well have generated frank discussions of potential illegal 
activity, poor planning, political interferences or systemic failures. Although 
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"getting at the real story" is the point of personal interviews, it obviously raises 
ethical issues. Being well aware that the researcher could offer no guaranteed 
confidentiality for illegal acts or protection from legal actions such as subpoenas 
or suits, he was faced with the very real dilemma of offering the most 
confidentiality possible while examining a topic that by its nature might have 
yielded exactly the type of data that could not be absolutely protected. No 
amount of informed consent or assurances of confidentiality can overcome that. 
Awareness of this potential conflict highlighted the need for strict observance of 
the informed consent process, and ultimately each participant decided for himself 
what the ultimate risk from participation was and how forthcoming to be. The 
researcher made it clear at every appropriate opportunity that he was conducting 
these interviews as an individual student researcher to fulfill degree 
requirements, and that the research was in no way associated with any type of 
work related activities. There was no evaluation of respondents or facilities 
outside of that necessary for the data collection and analysis described in this 
study. 
Even with as much objectivity and confidentiality as could be mustered, 
the researcher is confident that his background and occupation as a USEPA 
insider affected responses, but primarily to the positive. Many respondents 
appeared to try to "read" the researcher as responses were given and recorded, 
ostensibly to evaluate whether the response was adequate or met with approval. 
There were often inquiries as to whether the researcher or other respondents 
agreed or how EPA would feel about a particular issue or response. To each of 
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these the researcher reiterated the confidentiality assurances, his objectivity, his 
student researcher role and that there were no right or wrong answers. Most 
seemed cautiously reassured, and participant awareness of the researcher's 
depth of knowledge seemed to encourage considered responses. Even the 
Environmental, Health and Safety respondents, who might arguably be thought 
of as having the most to lose by talking with the researcher seemed to accept the 
notion of an objective and open evaluation. Overall, the researcher remains 
convinced that responses were candid and forthright, as evidenced by the data 
analysis. Clearly, the strong confidentiality assurances, existing relationships 
and open-ended questions proved the objective intent of the researcher and 
encouraged open dialogue. Voluntary participation and the abundance of candid 
and often conflicting opinions are evidence of that. 
In summary, all potential participants were adults and professionals in 
their respective fields and were only asked questions pertaining to their job-
related duties, with no personal or facility information or identifiers collected, and 
no compensation offered or expected. Added to the strict confidentiality 
procedures, voluntary participation and open-ended questions, there were no 
added risks to participants beyond those normally encountered in their daily lives 
and work environment. These study characteristics clearly added to the success 
of the research. 
Confidentiality 
Due to security, liability and confidentiality concerns, interview notes and the final 
research report use only coded identifiers. For example, the identifier for the 
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initial Environmental, Health and Safety respondent interview is "EHS-1." An 
initial interview of an On-Scene Coordinator or Local Emergency Responder was 
likewise coded as "OSC-1" or "LER-1" respectively. A follow-up interview with 
EHS-1 was coded as "EHS-1-F." No location information of any kind was 
recorded. This coding methodology prevents any identification or linkage of 
facilities or persons to specific results or even the study, and unless they choose 
to make known their involvement amongst themselves, participants are not 
aware of the identities, roles or responses of other participants. Researcher 
records are being kept in a secure location for the duration of the project and will 
be destroyed upon expiration of any required retention period. Retained texts 
were coded (i.e., "EHS-1 ") to allow the researcher to link data bits and then 
immediately redacted to remove any other identifiers related to the document 
origin. 
Institutional Review Board Approval 
As this research involved human subjects, Institutional Review Board approval 
was necessary (Oklahoma State University 2002). In the application, "exempt" 
review status was requested based on two factors. First, participants were not 
from designated special or vulnerable populations such as children. wards, 
prisoners, pregnant women, fetuses or economically or educationally 
disadvantaged persons. Secondly, risk to participants was low due to measures 
taken to ensure confidentiality of individuals and data, data reporting and 
retention. In no case was risk considered to be more than the risk undertaken by 
these participants in ordinary life. The application was delivered to the Board in 
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October 2003 and was approved without revision on September 19, 2003 as 
Application Number GU042. A copy of the approval is found in Appendix C. 
Data Analysis and Coding 
The emergent nature of qualitative inquiry enables the process of analysis to 
begin in the field, particularly with the pursuit of follow-up questions or the 
exploration of spontaneous insights. Thus, the researcher was provided with two 
main sources for organizing the analysis: questions developed prior to the 
interviews and insights that emerged during the interviews. Follow-up interviews 
are the tool by which gaps or the need for clarification within either or both of 
these sources are resolved (Patton 2002), and worked well for that purpose in 
the few cases in which they were necessary. 
The researcher feels that manual processing of the data provided a more 
intimate analysis and took advantage of his existing knowledge of the topics and 
participant roles. This allowed him more meaningful data interaction and 
opportunities to recognize emergent themes based on context and intuition. 
Following an analytical framework approach, responses from the original and 
follow-up interviews were grouped by common questions, with inductive content 
analysis of grouped responses and related fieldnotes achieved through manual 
coding and searching for broad, preliminary patterns or themes. Although 
differences in views and practices were identified between them, this is not a 
comparative study and no direct attempt at comparison between insider 
populations or facilities was made. 
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Data coding is a very subjective process. The method (Otto 2002) 
adopted for this project combined strengths of several available systems and had 
proven successful for the researcher in past analysis related to the current topic. 
For coding, relevant or interesting data from interviews, observations and 
documents was selected and separated into identifiable units. Each unit, 
whether a single complete thought, comment or description, was posted onto a 
separate index card and tagged with a unique source identifier, such as "Source 
= EHS-1-QS." That tag designates the source as Question #5 from the interview 
of Environmental, Health and Safety respondent 1, for example. A data unit from 
the follow-up interview of EHS-1 would likewise be tagged as "Source = EHS-1-
FQx." Redacted documents were similarly referenced using titles, page numbers 
or other identifiers suitable for efficient data tracking and navigation. An 
approximately equal number of units were drawn from interviews and fieldnotes, 
while documents represented a minor portion of the data. 
Once all selected units had been carded, the researcher shuffled the 
cards, read them again and began sorting. The goal was to be "emic" and not try 
to relate the data to the original questions or documents, but simply to sort units 
into groups that seem to go together. Data units were assigned to only one 
category, even if a category of one, with the name of that category added to the 
card. Each category name was marked on an additional card and added to the 
stack that it represented. All data cards were reshuffled and again sorted into 
categories, with category names added or modified as needed. Sorting 
continued until the arrangement seemed appropriate. Upon completion of the 
RISK PERCEPTION 51 
data coding and sorting, the researcher noted that data units tended to follow the 
respective questions. As discussed previously, this appears to be due to the 
pointed and succinct answers generally given by the respondents. In most cases 
the data units were so specific that they simply sorted into respective categories. 
Research results were grouped into two analysis chapters, risk perception and 
contingency planning. 
Document Analysis 
Written plans, risk assessments or other institutional texts represent the output of 
the social construction of the risk perceptions and practices that the interviews 
are seeking to evaluate. Although not a design component of this research, 
some participants offered documents as part of a response. Those were 
analyzed within the same theoretical frame and analysis methods as used for 
interview data. Challenges for analysis included securing permission to retain 
the document and take it off-site, deconstructing the document contents, 
assessing accuracy and linkage with fieldnotes (Patton 2002). 
Triangulation 
Triangulation potentially adds value to this research in two ways: validation of 
responses and added depth and richness of data. However, opportunities for 
either were relatively limited as the researcher did not attempt to educate 
participants or to validate their responses, but only recorded self-reported data 
regarding existing claimed perceptions and practices. No institutional texts were 
solicited and participants were not asked questions regarding the accuracy or 
veracity of responses of any other participant. Participants were not aware of the 
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identities, roles or responses of other participants unless they chose to make 
known their involvement amongst themselves. Validation was primarily by 
participant self-review, achieved during each post-interview debriefing during 
which responses and fieldnotes were discussed and reviewed for completeness 
and accuracy. In the few cases where institutional texts or other documents 
were offered and retained as part of an interview response, the researcher did 
not attempt to conduct any triangulation of data sources. Participant review of 
information gathered by telephone follow-up interviews was performed verbally. 
Generalizability 
Generalizability from this qualitative inquiry is problematical. The use of 
purposeful and snowball sampling within a particular group not necessarily 
representative of any larger population precludes statistical inferences. While the 
project includes no specific claims of external validity, or generalizability, it was 
likewise not the goal of this researcher to generate findings irrelevant outside of 
the sample population. It is possible for readers or users of any research, 
including this project, to evaluate the feasibility of case-to-case transfer 
(Firestone 1993), determining for themselves whether or how specific research 
results may be applied to their own circumstances. This is most valid when 
settings and other relevant conditions are similar to those in the original research, 
or when differences in those conditions are known and accounted for in the use 
of the data. 
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Assumptions and Limitations 
The researcher did not attempt to educate participants or to validate their 
responses. Rather he attempted only to record self-reported data regarding 
existing claimed perceptions and practices. As such, this research was 
conducted relying on, and subject to, specific assumptions and limitations. First, 
it was assumed that responses to interview questions were informed and truthful. 
Second, self-reporting was assumed a valid and reliable method of measuring 
individual risk perception. Third, it was assumed that facility self-reporting as 
required by Federal and State regulations is a valid and reliable method of 
identifying participant facilities and the magnitude of their respective potential 
offsite consequences. Based on the researcher's interaction with each of the 
respondents, these assumptions seem reasonable, and no obvious knowledge 
deficiencies or excursions from truthfulness were noted. In fact, all of these 
respondents appeared very knowledgeable regarding the topics covered in the 
interviews and seemed to genuinely engage the researcher. Regarding the 
selection of facilities with the largest potential offsite consequences, review of 
USEPA files and discussions with Federal On-Scene Coordinators lead the 
researcher to believe that the participant facilities were correctly selected and 
fairly represent the target population of facilities. 
While assumptions that might have influenced the accuracy of data 
collection appear to have been reasonable, due to the lack of any feasible 
method of substantiation, they nonetheless imply possible limitations. First, 
although not suspected, participants may have been evasive or less than truthful 
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regarding individual questions they may have perceived to be sensitive or 
potentially controversial. Second, although responses indicated the contrary, not 
all participants may have been well-informed regarding hazards and planning at 
the respective facilities, which may have biased responses. Third, facilities were 
selected based solely on self-reported potential offsite consequences. 
Inaccurate reporting would have reduced the priority risk ranking for, or omitted 
facilities that underestimated those impacts or failed to report at all. However, as 
discussed above this is not thought to be the case. Fourth, a limitation not 
subject to respondent input was sample size, 20 participants in a single study 
area. Although the data collected is valid for the participant sample group, risk 
perception and contingency planning trends identified in this research may not be 
indicative of other communities due to variances in issue-awareness, personnel 
competence, or other uncontrolled factors. 
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CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS OF RISK PERCEPTION AND DEFINING WORST-
CASE SCENARIOS 
Introduction 
The issues of risk assessment and contingency planning have taken on an 
increased sense of urgency since the attacks of September 11, 2001. In addition 
to routine concerns over catastrophic accidental releases, recent threats to 
civilian American populations by various terror groups have indicated willingness 
and capability to use unorthodox means including potential attacks on industrial 
and chemical facilities. The serious consideration of intentional acts or 
catastrophic accidents poses a unique challenge to planners and emergency 
responders, in that for either case these events represent low probability, but 
high potential magnitude scenarios. This requires difficult decisions regarding 
the investment to be made in the prevention and management of incidents that 
may never happen. Individual risk perception and organizational dynamics play 
a key role in making those decisions, and this chapter addresses the first of two 
research questions: How do insiders perceive risk and define worst-case 
scenarios? 
For the insider group participating in this study, the risk management 
process begins with the development of potential scenarios by organizations 
(Environmental, Health and Safety respondents), followed by review and debate 
within the larger group, which includes Local Emergency Responders and 
occasionally On-Scene Coordinators. As scenarios and impacts are proposed, 
debated and eventually adopted, Local Emergency Responders and On-Scene 
Coordinators develop additional plans and allocate resources to respond 
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adequately and safety from offsite. Plan events may impact individual or multiple 
facilities and may result in area or even regional impacts. The evaluation and 
planning process is not formal and follows no standard protocols or format, which 
is precisely the reason that this critical and previously unexamined role of the 
individual insider within the organization is the focus of this study. Respondent 
interaction and the organizational outputs are the basis for all planning efforts, 
eventually producing implemented contingency plans, examined in Chapter 6. 
To gain a better understanding of the initial assessment and deliberation 
process, respondents were asked questions regarding risk identification and 
assessment; potential worst-case scenarios beyond those addressed in 
contingency plans; the role of Offsite Consequence Analyses; and perceived risk 
to onsite and offsite responders during worst-case events. Respondents were 
attentive and generally focused on the specific questions at hand, and interviews 
were conducted in a variety of settings, ranging from restaurants to offices to 
airplanes. The often-candid responses provided the researcher with an intimate 
look at the respective points of view of the participants and, even then, prior to 
any formal analysis the influence of several sociological theories of 
organizational deviance was apparent. This chapter is grouped into five themes 
that emerged from analysis of the data and which seemed to fairly describe the 
essence of the particular topic: Experience and Common Sense; Predicting the 
Unpredictable; Across the Fence; Home Court Advantage; and They Aren't 
Making Ice Cream in Those Plants, concluding with Summary of Risk Perception 
and Worst-Case Scenarios. 
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Experience and Common Sense 
The process of defining and framing threats and events as "realistic" is perhaps 
the single most important step in the contingency planning process, as this 
creates the scenario pool to be considered and eventually acted upon by 
planners. When asked questions regarding this process, respondents 
overwhelmingly relied on a definition based on personal, site and industry 
experience and "common sense." Groups displayed near-consensus that events 
must be judged based on "whether something like that could really happen." 
Many descriptions of program components were offered in support of what 
constitutes a reasonable evaluation, including adherence to good engineering 
and management practices, process safety and other regulations, consideration 
of site specific conditions, personnel training, specific chemical hazards and 
predictive models which incorporate estimates and probabilities regarding these 
and other related criteria. Taken together, such an elaborate but subjective 
system was put forth as a "reasonable estimate of probability." 
All respondents agreed that response actions since the attacks on 
September 11, 2001 were "safer and more somber'' and that prior to that day the 
attitude was "respond and rescue at all costs." This implies both a marked shift 
in the threshold for perceived "realistic" events and risks and an assumption that 
prior to that day "all costs" had been well understood and relatively low. Thus, it 
appears that the magnitude of the events and loss of responders on that day 
served in one blow to push back the boundaries of disqualification by providing a 
"real life" demonstration of an "impossible" scenario. Whether those events were 
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the result or "failures of foresight" (Turner 1976) or disqualification (Clarke 1993), 
this shift clearly illustrates the role of history and personal experience in the 
perception of risk. 
Regarding threats of worst-case scenarios outside those featured in 
contingency plans, all respondents felt that going beyond experience and the 
"common sense" definition of realistic was simply unacceptable. The sole 
exceptions were those instances where regulatory requirements forced them to 
do so, as in the case of Risk Management Plans where standardized worst-case 
scenarios are required from each reporting facility. These mandatory scenarios 
address either explosions or vapor cloud releases of listed flammable or toxic 
chemicals, or both if the reporting facility has both classes of materials onsite. 
Respondents were nearly unified in their positions that such scenarios were so 
extreme and only so remotely possible as to serve no real purpose beyond 
"scaring the public." One noted that past events "are bad enough without having 
to get too imaginative" and that "everything else was just a guess," a view shared 
by nearly all. In sharp contrast, a single Local Emergency Responder 
admonished planners to "never say never" when evaluating scenarios, however 
even this person ultimately relied strongly on the "common sense" approach, 
indicating that he would "just be a little more open-minded when setting the upper 
end." 
Numerous respondents felt that "we should stop obsessing with extreme 
scenarios" and be less concerned with "the big one" because "there is a big 
difference between perception and reality," referring to the image of "the big one" 
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as a misrepresentation of a much simpler and safer reality. This view is 
consistent with both Clarke's (1993) disqualification heuristic and Gephart's 
(1984) notion of organizationally based environmental disasters (OBEDs) in 
which business interests construe accidents as "unanticipated, rare" (p. 211) 
events. When asked by the researcher to examine this position in light of recent 
world events and consider intentional acts, Environmental, Health and Safety 
respondents remained unified in their position that such scenarios were so 
unlikely as to be of no value and relatively low risk. They felt that enhanced 
security, restriction of "sensitive" information from the public, vulnerability 
assessments and other "defensive" measures would readily negate such threats. 
This view was sharply opposed by other respondents, who expressed concern 
over the potential for large intentional acts, particularly with the loss of public 
oversight and potentially decreased vigilance. Most Local Emergency 
responders and On-Scene Coordinators felt that not only could such events 
occur, but that their response capabilities could easily be exceed and that 
planning and preparation must be "comprehensive and out in the open." 
Environmental, Health and Safety respondents felt that planning for such events 
was beyond their scope. Arguments for and against this position are examined 
in Predicting the Unpredictable within this chapter. 
When discussions of the definition process turned to group interaction, 
most respondents, noting that "this is not an exact science," indicated that 
although the process might begin with individual experiences and opinions, the 
final product is eventually "negotiated by committee," with the particular views of 
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senior emergency managers or planners eventually winning out if there is 
disagreement. This posed a serious issue for several individuals who recounted 
examples of "scaling down" or outright disqualification of what they felt were very 
legitimate scenarios in favor of lesser or simpler ones, completely in line with 
Clarke (1993). By contrast, no one could dictate any examples of final scenarios 
being scaled up beyond recommendations. Regarding input to the process from 
outside the specific assessment or planning group, there was strong consensus 
that it was welcome, but only on the condition that it meet the "reasonableness" 
standard employed within the particular group. This position is again reminiscent 
of Clarke's (1993; 1999) notions of disqualification and the tendency of planners, 
or "fantasizers" (p. 167), to rule out those who criticize them as irrelevant to the 
discussions. 
When asked questions about debate or checks and balances between 
respondent groups, all generally agreed that "'realistic' is up to the facility to 
decide," and that others, including themselves in the case of Local Emergency 
Responders and On-Scene Coordinators, had little or no legitimate role in that 
process. This is consistent with Clarke's (1988) theory that organizations, in this 
case chemical facilities, rather than the public define acceptable risk. Although 
Local Emergency Responders and On-Scene Coordinators did not indicate 
having lost power struggles or otherwise resisting this outcome, their positions 
reflected an obvious information dependency with the result of framing of 
scenarios left to facility Environmental, Health and Safety personnel, again per 
Clarke (1993). 
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In summary this first step in the contingency planning process, the social 
construction of "realistic" as it relates to worst-case scenarios, appears on the 
surface to be a straightforward, consensus issue of experience and "common 
sense." There is a clear trend toward equating history and experience with 
"common sense" and imposition of that standard on the group process, 
particularly when dealing with outside input. Mandatory worst-case scenarios are 
seen as "extreme" and are disregarded in favor of "things that could really 
happen." On all of these points respondents readily agree within and across 
groups. However, when viewed from outside, it is apparent that within this 
insider group specific sociological theories of organizational deviance play 
significant roles, Clarke's (1993) disqualification heuristic being by far the 
dominant influence. 
Local Emergency Responders and On-Scene Coordinators disclaimed 
any role in the definition of facility risk and clearly illustrated information 
dependencies, describing "negotiation by committee" and "scaling down" of 
scenarios by senior managers and planners. With organizations ultimately 
defining acceptable risk (Clarke 1988) and significant accidents or intentional 
acts perceived as rare, unanticipated events (Gephart 1984), the organizational 
output of an elite minority of individuals within this participant group appears 
essentially unchallenged. 
Predicting the Unpredictable 
Respondents were asked questions regarding their perception of worst-case 
scenarios that might affect their respective facilities or, in the case of Local 
RISK PERCEPTION 62 
Emergency Responders and On-Scene Coordinators, any or all of the facilities 
within the sample population. The researcher explained that this was not 
intended to evoke a complex process analysis, only general scenarios that might 
lie outside those reflected in the published contingency plans, which then could 
be related in simple terms of relative magnitude, i.e. larger, smaller, the same. 
The object was to explore whether respondents viewed plan scenarios as 
adequate within their own operating definition of "common sense" and realistic, 
as discussed in Experience and Common Sense within this chapter, and if not 
what they would put forth instead. Within and across groups, there was sharp 
disagreement over nearly every aspect of published and alternative scenarios, 
defining worst-case, regulatory approaches and motives. 
The majority view of Local Emergency Responders and On-Scene 
Coordinators was that worst-case scenarios would almost certainly be "big 
events that the plans never talk about." These events would be "much worse 
than the plan," with many feeling that facilities "take care of their own" and would 
not worry about impacts on others, resulting in "bare minimum scenarios where 
almost none of the events are very bad and everything always works." Several 
shared the opinion that "facilities plan only for events that they can afford and 
manage," insisting "we should be and are looking at larger, more exotic events," 
since they "almost never happen, but do." 
On the surface this position seems to contrast sharply with the views put 
forth in Experience and Common Sense, in which most respondents indicated a 
common awareness of the paternal role of facilities in defining acceptable risk 
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and constructing scenarios, and complete agreement that going beyond 
"common sense" and worrying about extreme scenarios was neither useful nor 
acceptable. However, the researcher proposes that in fact the views are 
consistent since at this point the disagreement is not really over whether to use 
"common sense" as the standard for planning, but instead whose version of 
"common sense," falling squarely back upon Clarke's (1988; 1993) notions of the 
disqualification heuristic and the organizational capture of the role of defining 
risk. A small minority adopted a less jaded view of motives, allowing that 
potential events would exceed plan estimates simply because "planners might 
not have adequate experience and awareness." The lack of regulatory 
requirements to address criminal acts and "wholesale failures" was blamed by 
some for ''failures due to a low planning bar." In contrast, another minority group 
felt that although Risk Management Program requirements allow no flexibility and 
do not look at intentional or multiple effects, the approach is fair and useful 
because it is standardized and evenly applied. In all cases, these respondents 
were in complete agreement that for larger-than-planned events "we would be 
underprepared and areas and people affected that were thought safe." 
As a group, Environmental, Health and safety respondents offered no 
scenarios outside of the "reasonably foreseeable events" contained in their 
respective plans, and described "going to a great deal of effort" to ensure that the 
plans would be effective. They universally felt that their scenarios represented 
realistic events, controls and outcomes, disqualifying other possibilities within 
their control. In this view, they stood alone and in sharp disagreement with the 
RISK PERCEPTION 64 
other respondents. Many Environmental, Health and Safety respondents 
consistently indicated that mandatory Risk Management Program worst-case 
scenarios are "extreme and only scare the public." When asked to speculate 
how any event might exceed the plan, they indicated concerns of having publicly 
available planning information used against them by revealing "sensitive data," 
thereby allowing someone to exploit the facility contingency plan or even the 
Area Contingency Plan, which is the integrated planning document for the entire 
region. They proposed that in such a scenario, facilities would be victims of 
intentional acts beyond their control, which could not reasonably be anticipated, 
and for which they should not be held responsible. When asked whether the 
admitted possibility of such an event made it worthy of consideration for planning, 
the group felt that such events were beyond the scope of individual facility 
planning and were a "regional and governmental issue" requiring outside 
resources and controls. This position is directly in line with Gephart's (1984) 
notion of Organizationally Based Environmental Disasters and "political sense-
making" (p. 212), wherein capital interests succeed in normalizing negative 
outcomes and avoid individual liability for these "rare and unpreventable" events. 
Turner's (1976) "failures of foresight" model seems applicable here in that 
Environmental, Health and Safety respondents did not fail to anticipate such 
events, but instead deflected responsibility and liability, relying on others to 
shoulder the burden, consequently taking little or no individual action. 
Reconstruction of an eventual failure of this type would almost certainly illustrate 
Turner's criteria of ignoring warning signs and discounting the possibility of 
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disaster. However, at that point the argument might be made by Environmental, 
Health and Safety respondent organizations that in fact they anticipated and 
even warned of such outcomes, but that responsible others failed to take 
appropriate action to protect them. Thus, these groups might claim victim status 
by asserting claims of recreancy (Freudenburg 1993) and "failures of foresight" 
(Turner 1976) against the other victims, those being the government and society. 
Such a scenario does not support Perrow's (1999) notion of "normal accidents" in 
that although an outcome of complex systems, such failures are actually 
foreseeable and not the result of unknown interactions. 
Environmental, Health and Safety respondents noted that external acts 
should be of much greater concern to planners than "theoretical" catastrophic 
failures within a facility, which are reportedly minimized by adherence to strong 
design, safety and security procedures. Most other respondents sharply 
contrasted these views, indicating that even if letting Environmental, Health and 
Safety respondent facilities define worst-case scenarios might be more accurate, 
which they did not believe, "they might not be forthcoming or able to do the job," 
voicing skepticism and a concern over vulnerability to recreancy (Freudenburg 
1993). The opposing sides of this issue described irritation at the picture painted 
of them by others, and at having motives questioned. 
Several respondents across groups felt that the current "obsession with 
exotic scenarios" overshadowed day-to-day events and risks, which in their 
opinion posed the greatest threat to any facility. In explaining this position, this 
group tended to appear somewhat exasperated, expressing frustration that 
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worst-case scenarios were seen as predictors of the future, not just theoretical 
possibilities. No one was happy about it. Some were angry, while others simply 
shrugged it off as something beyond their control or as a cost of doing business 
in post-9/11 America. One respondent voiced a distinctly candid view in his 
description of a worst-case scenario: "Being forced to shut down or relocate due 
to WMD [Weapons of Mass Destruction] or worst-case scenario paranoia is 
worse than killing or sickening a few thousand people'." He was admittedly bitter 
about the perceived treatment of chemical facilities by regulators and public 
watchdog groups, explaining that he had no wish for anyone to ever be injured, 
but that trying to reduce all risk to zero was "killing" an industry. In another telling 
reflection of normalization of negative outcomes (Gephart 1984), his alternative 
worst-case would be the use of a chemical plant as a Weapon of Mass 
Destruction, since "people would lose faith in the industry." Asked what kind of 
"faith" people had in "the industry," this person described how people relied 
everyday on the products and jobs that the chemical industry provides on a 
reliable and safe basis. The referenced "faith" was that the reliable process was 
done, and would continue, with the best interest of everyone at heart and with 
honest motives. Although this individual may or may not have been alone in his 
thoughts, he was unique in voicing these opinions. 
The very few neutral respondents felt that whether the worst case was 
more or less than the required Risk Management Plan scenarios would depend 
on the specific facility and their respective conditions and resources, concluding 
that scenarios "may be worse or better, but they will definitely be different." 
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Within this group, certain Local Emergency Responders made a very clear 
division between human and environmental concerns: 'We have to watch out for 
people, so the environment is on its own." Said candidly and without emotion, 
this might seem to an outsider as contradictory to the overall view of community 
risk management. It is not. The "people first" tenet referenced numerous times 
in this study is a very real decision-making tool for these respondents. It is not a 
shirking of duty by ignoring effects on the environment. It is simply a vivid 
observation that as first responders their job is to save lives. Everything else is a 
bonus. Reading visual cues during the interviews and listening to the blunt 
words, it is obvious that these people are serious about their work, and they take 
the responsibility to heart. Published plans aside, they will intercede on behalf of 
the public. In their view, a release "does not have to be big, just effective" and so 
they focus their efforts on areas where "chemicals are in proximity to people" with 
little regard to plan scenarios. 
In summary this step in the contingency planning process, evaluation of 
the adequacy of worst-case scenarios, appears highly controversial with 
respondent comments clearly demonstrating the role of organizations in defining 
acceptable risk (Clarke 1988) and framing significant events as rare and 
unanticipated (Gephart 1984). While all respondents generally agreed that the 
scenarios defined within the Risk Management Program were neither adequate 
nor realistic, the claimed reasons for this were clearly opposing and divided 
between facilities, which argue that they are extreme and unreasonable, and 
most others which argue that they do not go far enough in considering intentional 
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acts or "superevents." The combination of normalized negative outcomes, facility 
aversion to liability for planning for external acts or events and the prevalent 
influence of disqualification results in the construction and institutionalization of 
worst-case scenarios for which facilities show unwavering support and of which 
most recipients are openly skeptical. 
Across the Fence 
One tool available to planners and emergency responders is the Offsite 
Consequence Analysis required by the Risk Management Program for each of 
the participant facilities in this study. The analysis considers various site 
conditions and relies on certain assumptions and models to predict potential 
offsite impacts and the distances at which they may occur. The type and 
magnitude of the worst-case scenario varies by chemical, but is specified in the 
Program rule and cannot be modified by the facility. Respondents were asked 
questions regarding the use and value of Offsite Consequence Analyses in the 
planning and response process. While responses revealed some disagreement 
but no sharp divisions between groups, there was consensus that protecting 
people was the primary goal, with effects on the environment being of much less 
concern. 
Environmental, Health and Safety respondents were divided on the issue 
of whether the magnitude of events reflected in the scenarios was reasonable, 
with approximately half stating that they were subjective and overly conservative, 
representing scenarios that are "too big," "extreme" and "unrealistic," serving only 
to "scare people rather than educate them." Because of this, that group viewed 
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the analyses as not useful and essentially an "exercise for regulatory 
compliance" with no practical purpose. The remaining respondents were less 
. critical of the large magnitude of the prescribed events, describing them as 
"somewhere between ignore and absolute science," indicating that regardless of 
whether the models were "excessive," they had value as a tool for prioritizing 
planning and outreach efforts. 
Many respondents voiced the general opinion that since "everything 
usually makes it across the fence," Offsite Consequence Analyses were a means 
to "look outside the fence in a meaningful way" and focus limited resources in 
areas of greatest concern. The majority saw the analyses as a vehicle to raise 
awareness for "people in at-risk areas" or for "special populations" such as 
nursing homes, schools and hospitals. There was general agreement that 
chemical events "will not kill most people," making the analyses a good tool with 
which to engage the media in attempting to devise warnings that could be 
focused in the appropriate areas. In this way, during an emergency a specific 
group of affected persons could be reached and instructed to take appropriate 
action, i.e. evacuate, shelter-in-place, as opposed to broadcasting general 
warnings across large areas. This raises the issue of whether models are 
sufficiently accurate to allow such precise demarcation. The consensus 
response was that even with potentially large margins of error, the conservative 
nature of the analyses yielded the largest conceivable areas of impact, and 
therefore probably represented more than the likely worst-case scenario for the 
specific event. While this argument bolstered Environmental, Health and Safety 
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respondent claims that the models were indeed excessive, there was near 
consensus, even if reluctantly, that for a "worst-case" planning tool, this was 
actually an advantage, in essence "erring on the side of safety." 
A minority view held that the consequence analyses were only useful as a 
secondary source of information, preferring to base planning on the results of 
inspections, site history and participation in planning efforts to "get a feel for 
response needs and capabilities." Indicating a tendency toward disqualification, 
these respondents felt that if analyses were not "realistic," the planning area 
should be reduced to fit the perceived threat. When other respondents were 
asked how or whether this specific issue of "scaling down" might influence 
planning, they were evenly divided between using the predicted extent of the 
impact as a planning boundary and adjusting the area based on review and 
group reaction to the area of concern. As the requirement for development of the 
consequence analyses does not extend to any actual use of the information, this 
response illustrates the vulnerability of the planning process at this point to 
disqualification and organizational capture of the role of defining risk (Clarke 
1988; 1993). 
In summary, arguments continued over whether worst-case events 
developed for Offsite Consequence Analyses are too unlikely and only "scare 
people" or they have value as a planning tool. However, in keeping with the 
"people come first" tenet of this group, respondents were generally able to agree, 
even if reluctantly, that although possibly extreme and not necessarily accurate, 
the analyses were at least useful as a guide for prioritizing and delineating 
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planning and outreach efforts. The key contributions cited by most respondents 
were use of the models to identify "special populations" which might be affected, 
and being able to focus warnings within targeted areas of concern. However, 
concerns and debate were evident over the appropriateness of "scaled down" 
areas of concern and proportionately reduced levels of effort and resource 
commitment. Although development of the consequence analyses is mandated 
by the Risk Management Program, use of this tool for planning is optional and 
clearly its role is subjective and tends to be "negotiated by committee." In this 
environment, disqualification and organizational capture of the role of defining 
risk (Clarke 1988; 1993) appear to be key influences in the outcome. 
Home Court Advantage 
Each of the participant facilities in this study maintains an onsite Hazardous 
Materials Emergency Response Team. These onsite Teams reportedly receive 
extensive training and resources and are expected to perform as "first 
responders" in the event of a hazardous material incident at their respective 
facilities. 
To gain a better understanding of the perceived risk to onsite responders, 
respondents were asked questions regarding risk to their Teams while 
responding to worst-case events at their respective facilities. There was near 
consensus that risk for onsite responders should be lower relative to offsite 
responders due to "home court advantage," and without exception 
Environmental, Health and Safety respondents reported this to be the case. 
They supported this position by highlighting "good training and resources," noting 
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that "ER [emergency response] risk is always potentially high for anyone" but 
these inherent risks are minimized by "stressing safety and preparedness" for 
these "committed, well trained and professional" Teams. Noting that "we live 
here and care more than anyone what happens," several voiced the opinion that 
"we are in the business of safety and risk reduction and feel very confident of our 
abilities." This suggests the influence of other characteristics of Clarke's (1993) 
disqualification heuristic, those being a heavy reliance on assumptions about the 
process and a tendency to view them as safe. 
When asked about risk to responders during events that might exceed 
Plan scenarios, one Environmental, Health and Safety respondent insisted that 
"The level of risk would not exceed the equipment and training capabilities of our 
personnel, and nothing is worth getting an employee killed." All indicated that 
"they would back off" if necessary in the interest of safety, while one remarked 
that "sci-fi events are too extreme to be of practical concern," again exhibiting a 
tendency toward disqualification (Clarke 1993). 
Although divided on the issue, most Local Emergency Responders and 
On-Scene Coordinators voiced two sharp criticisms of the "home court 
advantage" theory, the first being a strong concern that although "those guys live 
there everyday," which should lower their risk, the familiar routines and 
experiences actually make them complacent and less cautious. Most felt that 
while "plans make it sound like very low risk for onsite responders," at many 
facilities that assumption is simply not accurate. "Those guys don't think they 
can get hurt and are too willing to take significant risks" was a common 
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reference. However, several within these groups indicated confidence that 
facilities are more realistic about their own hazards and "know best what needs 
to be done," minimizing risk through "greater awareness, process knowledge, 
preparation and resources." A distinct minority reported that risk for onsite 
responders "is all over the board," is directly related to the level of effort and 
resources and would vary by facility. The second criticism of "home court 
advantage" leveled by several Local Emergency Responders and On-Scene 
Coordinators was that facilities and onsite responders tend to "focus on saving 
their own" and often "do not look beyond their fence" when planning or 
responding. This "puts everyone else at risk" due to the lack of information and 
little or no warning time. This view is in line with Clarke and Short's (1993) notion 
of a misplaced reliance on organizations to respond adequately to accidents 
when in reality failure to perform is actually normal. In those cases where offsite 
and onsite responders would operate jointly, many respondents felt that risk was 
higher for everyone due to the lack of extensive experience together and the 
problem of "having to get to know each other" during a crisis, particularly since 
the initial stage of an emergency "is always the most dangerous for everyone." 
Some indicated that the problem would be exacerbated by reliance on plans 
which "looked good when we got them," but failed to adequately address 
scenarios and resource needs, again referring to arguments put forth in 
Predicting the Unpredictable within this chapter. 
In summary, there was consensus among respondents that in theory 
facility resources, training and process familiarity provided a strong "home court 
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advantage" that should serve to lower risk significantly for onsite responders. 
Although Environmental, Health and Safety respondents were unanimous in their 
agreement with this theory, most other respondents indicated that home court 
advantage was actually a disadvantage, promoting complacency, feelings of 
"invincibility" and a willingness to take significant risks, made worse for all by 
reliance on inadequate plan scenarios and a tendency for facilities to "take care 
of their own." These opposing views clearly demonstrate the continuing 
influence of disqualification (Clarke 1993) on the part of facilities and the 
institutionalized reliance on facilities to adequately respond to their own events 
(Clarke and Short 1993) even over the skepticisms and objections of most 
outside responders and planners (Gephart 1984). 
They Aren't Making Ice Cream in Those Plants 
Offsite response Teams are represented primarily by the Local Emergency 
Responder and On-Scene Coordinator participants in this study. In some cases 
participant facility onsite Teams have mutual aid agreements whereby they are 
committed to respond upon request to incidents at other facilities. For the 
purpose of this study, facility Teams responding to or from other facilities are also 
considered as "offsite responders." This data analysis section examines 
perceived risk to offsite responders while responding to worst-case events at 
participant facilities. 
Respondents were highly divided on this issue, with sharp disagreement 
over both the degree of risk and the rationales. While most Environmental, 
Health and Safety respondents indicated that they would prefer to handle 
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responses "internally as much as possible," all recognized that during major 
events there would necessarily be interaction between onsite and offsite 
responders, and all agreed that these joint operations increased complexity and 
risk. However, nearly all declined to flatly characterize risk to outside 
responders, indicating instead that because of differing Standard Operating 
Procedures (SOPs) and skill levels, "risk to them [outside responders] is not as 
simple as high or low," proposing that whether risk was high or low "was up to 
them [outside responders] to decide." The remaining Environmental, Health and 
Safety respondents felt that even with high safety standards, risk to offsite 
responders would be relatively high, not due to inherently hazardous facilities 
and processes, but rather "their relative lack of familiarity and experience with our 
site and people" and because it is "always risky to play outside your own area." 
Respondents were then asked to consider the issue of whether the 
chemical facilities were inherently high-hazard and facing unforeseeable 
catastrophic outcomes (Perrow 1999), and whether they saw that as an 
uncontrollable, high-risk proposition for them. Local Emergency Responders and 
On-Scene Coordinators generally indicated that although "they aren't making ice 
cream in those plants," there were few if any events that could not be anticipated 
or prevented with adequate attention paid to warning signs such as "near misses" 
and simply admitting the possibility of significant events. While giving no support 
to Perrow's (1999) notion of "normal accidents," this view falls completely in line 
with Turner (1976) and Clarke (1993; 1999). Of course, one must leave open the 
possibility that even with proper foresight and intervention, the possibility of 
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Perrow's (1999) inevitable failures cannot be discounted based simply on 
working or anecdotal observations. 
Most On-Scene Coordinators did not characterize themselves as "first 
responders" since they would not be the first to arrive on-scene, instead 
relegating "that honor" to the Local Emergency Responders, described by most 
respondents as "well-trained and professional." Among On-Scene Coordinators 
there was general agreement that offsite first responders (Local Emergency 
Responders and Mutual Aid Teams) lacked direct facility knowledge and 
experience, increasing their risk when responding to major events. While most 
felt that the resulting high level of apprehension during a major event would serve 
to make offsite responders more cautious, theoretically reducing risk, all agreed 
that "surprises" inevitably result in increased risk. However, some respondents 
indicated that simply being cautious and thereby "delaying response activities" 
inherently reduced risk, at least for that Team. This was explained as not a 
reluctance or evasion of duties, but rather avoiding a "fools rush in" response. 
Regardless of their feelings on risk to responders, there was general 
agreement between On-Scene Coordinators that offsite responders do a much 
better job of "looking beyond the fence" when planning and responding. 
However, one individual felt that this concern might extend "even to the point of 
sacrificing it [the facility]," a view later justified by the "people first" paradigm of 
the Local Emergency Responders and On-Scene Coordinators "if push comes to 
shove." Overall, every On-Scene Coordinator felt that the key to reducing risk 
was for responders was to "know their limitations" and be able to react to 
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"Murphy's Law," which many of them described as "the only constant in all of 
this," referring to surprises as changing or unexpected conditions which fall 
outside of the Plan. 
Within the Local Emergency Responder group, there was consensus that 
as first responders the lack of specific experience and familiarity with facility 
processes and chemicals put them at a decided disadvantage, voiced frequently 
as "It's dangerous for us because we don't live there." However, beyond the 
simple, inherent lack of familiarity, several felt that offsite responders are "simply 
not fully informed" due to standardized plans and reporting documents that are 
often "big on information, light on details," reflecting the scientific resolution of 
risk assessment and the political treatment of risk acceptability (Clark 1988). 
One Local Emergency Responder noted that in some cases, "You could read it 
[the Plan] all day and still not know what's going to happen when you get there." 
Contractors were described as particularly problematic, cited often as the 
source of facility accidents due to a combination of poor work practices such as 
"lighting up next to the 'No Smoking' signs" and not having the time, ability or 
inclination to process or understand the information that might be provided them 
prior to work on a site. These are all characteristics of disasters noted by Turner 
(1976). While many described "waiting for the other shoe to fall" whenever 
facilities had large numbers of contractors onsite in "sensitive" areas, 
Environmental, Health and Safety respondents disagreed, asserting that strong 
work rules are in place and applicable to everyone on the site and that 
"awareness and information flow both ways is strong." 
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Several Local Emergency Responders felt that risk to them would vary by 
facility, influenced heavily by the facility representatives on which they rely for 
advice on safety matters, while most echoed the opinion heard from OSCs that 
heightened awareness and caution on their part should serve to reduce their risk. 
However, caution aside, all Local Emergency Responders reported feeling very 
vulnerable to "bad surprises," having learned "not to blindly trust plans or people," 
obviously reacting to the threat of recreancy (Freudenburg 1993) as well as the 
inherent hazards of "just plain dangerous work." References to Murphy's Law 
were frequent. 
A common sentiment expressed by Local Emergency Responders and 
On-Scene Coordinators regarding the role of communication in response risk 
management was, "In this business, lack of information kills." Lack of information 
and poor communication, either during planning or as events unfold, were cited 
as "the most common killers" and the primary reasons that responders "might 
drive right into the cloud." Regarding the ability of contingency plans to "even 
this up," many of these respondents felt that even under the best of conditions 
and with the best of plans, changing conditions and "surprises" assured a "high 
risk operation every time." 
Many Local Emergency Responders and On-Scene Coordinators 
continued to voice concerns that Plans tended to be inadequate. Many 
Environmental, Health and Safety respondents disagreed, saying, "If they 
reviewed and understood the information we gave them, risk should be low" 
particularly during joint operations. However, these are precisely the events that 
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all other respondents identified as the highest risk for everyone, again 
demonstrating the influences of disqualification (Clarke 1993) and political sense-
making (Gephart 1984). In this case, the respondents preemptively assign 
blame for potential response failures to human error on the part of the end users, 
Local Emergency Responders, of a planning process dominated by the 
originators of the plans, Environmental, Health and Safety respondents and their 
organizations. 
It is appropriate at this point to discuss the cues taken from the 
participants during this line of questioning that simply could not be captured in 
field notes. Although Environmental, Health and Safety respondents and On-
Scene Coordinators obviously have concerns over safety of everyone, the 
difference between them and the Local Emergency Responders was striking. 
For example, when the researcher was told, "They aren't making ice cream in 
those plants," the voice on the other side of the table was flat and as serious as 
the proverbial heart attack. There was no humor and the statement was certainly 
intended to politely answer a question that for these respondents reflects life and 
death issues. The tone was dark and said far more than the words. Nearly 
everyone in this Responder group displayed the same grim awareness and 
acceptance of life threatening work. References to plans "light on details," not 
knowing "what's going to happen when you get there," "lack of information kills," 
"waiting for the other shoe to fall" and "bad surprises" were given with calm 
resolve. These responders are aware that planning and actions by others 
directly affect their chances of staying alive, and it is apparent that they are not 
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impressed with the "help" they are getting in the form of contingency plans. In all 
of these responses, words were few and the eye contact firm, emphasizing the 
seriousness of the issue. The camaraderie between them was obvious, and 
frankly the researcher had little need to probe or ask follow-up questions. Plenty 
was said in those few words. 
In summary, there was general agreement that offsite responders face 
relatively high risk, but various theories as to why. With the exception of the 
Environmental, Health and Safety group, nearly all respondents made frequent 
references to "bad surprises" as the "guaranteed wild card" that raises risk for 
offsite responders "every time." These surprises were largely attributed to events 
falling outside of those addressed in institutionalized plans, poor communication 
and to a lesser extent contractor error and/or "just plain dangerous work." 
Outside responders clearly feel a sense of high risk and vulnerability, often 
"waiting for the other shoe to fall." This puts them squarely at odds with 
Environmental, Health and Safety respondents, who tended to describe high risk 
to outside responders, if it exists at all, as a condition completely of their own 
making and not due to any inherent hazards of the site. Responses and 
opposing positions across all groups demonstrate clearly the influences of 
organizational disqualification (Clarke 1993), conflict over risk assessment and 
acceptability (Clarke 1988), political sense-making (Gephart 1984), and concerns 
over vulnerability to recreancy (Freudenburg 1993). 
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Summary of Risk Perception and Worst-Case Scenarios 
This chapter addressed the first of two research questions: How do insiders 
perceive risk and define worst-case scenarios? Respondents discussed 
perceptions of risk, defining "realistic," potential worst-case scenarios beyond 
those addressed in contingency plans; the role of Offsite Consequence Analyses; 
and perceived risk to onsite and offsite responders during worst-case events. 
Regarding the issue of defining "realistic," there was near consensus on the use 
of "common sense," but sharp disagreement over what that was and whose 
version was accurate. Respondents were deeply divided on the question of 
defining worst-case scenarios and assessing risk to offsite responders, while on 
most other questions positions and rationales varied less dramatically. 
It is apparent that for this group of respondents the process of defining 
"realistic" is far from resolved, even with the consensus use of "common sense" 
as the gauge. In fact, the seemingly intuitive use of "common sense" may 
actually create the heavy reliance on "experts" and assumptions about complex 
processes (Clarke 1999), since simplifying and managing complex issues is what 
experts ostensibly do best. However, this is not a simple matter of availability of 
information or experience, and expert "common sense" implies full understanding 
and consideration of every possibility, allowing risk to be managed in a 
defensible, scientific manner (Clarke 1988). Environmental, Health and Safety 
respondents saw this as an appropriate application of "common sense," while 
other respondents objected strongly, feeling that it is a one-sided approach which 
favors the facilities, demonstrating a power struggle between the parties (Clarke 
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1988) that ultimately "scales down" the significance of the threat posed by the 
facilities or at least the discussion of it. 
Regarding the construction of appropriate worst-case scenarios, there is 
agreement that mandated worst-case scenarios are neither adequate nor 
realistic. However, the rationales were polarized between Environmental, Health 
and Safety respondents, arguing that the scenarios are extreme and 
unreasonable, and most others arguing that the scenarios do not go far enough. 
Showing unwavering support for scenarios of which most other respondents are 
openly skeptical, in the end it appears that facility contingency plans won out and 
planners and responders relegated themselves to managing "surprises" at every 
turn, openly expressing concerns over vulnerability to the threat of recreancy 
(Freudenburg 1993). In discussing these "surprises," outside responders 
contrasted Environmental, Health and Safety respondent claims of "home court 
advantage," voicing concerns over complacency, inadequate plans and a 
tendency to focus "inside the fence" to the detriment to others. As a result, Local 
Emergency Responders clearly feel a sense of "high risk" for themselves, putting 
them directly at odds with Environmental, Health and Safety respondents, who 
tend to describe outsider risk as a condition completely of their own making. This 
contrast demonstrates the influences of organizational disqualification (Clarke 
1993), conflict over risk assessment and acceptability (Clarke 1988) and political 
sense making (Gephart 1984). 
In conclusion, Environmental, Health and Safety respondent organizations 
within this participant group have clearly claimed the role of defining acceptable 
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risk, and within that group Clarke's (1993) disqualification heuristic is by far the 
dominant influence. Significant accidents or intentional acts remain portrayed as 
rare, unanticipated events, unrealistic and therefore excluded from consideration 
in contingency plans. From this the organizational output of a minority of 
individuals appears to have been implemented and institutionalized even over 
the concerns of other participants. There is little doubt that careful reconstruction 
of a catastrophic failure under these conditions would certainly be seen in 
hindsight as a clear failure of foresight (Turner 1976), following in the example of 
the "impossible" events of September 11, 2001. 
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CHAPTER 6: ANALYSIS OF RISK PERCEPTION AS A DRIVER FOR 
CONTINGENCY PLANNING 
Introduction 
Purportedly a great deal of effort goes into developing a contingency plan, 
starting with which scenarios should be considered and why. As a guideline, the 
Risk Management Program details mandatory worst-case scenarios for each of 
the participant facilities in this study. However, beyond analyzing those 
scenarios for offsite consequences, there are no requirements for how that 
information is used. 
As the written output of an internal risk assessment process, a facility 
contingency plan becomes the foundation for all subsequent internal and external 
emergency response planning regarding that facility. These Plans incorporate 
potential event scenarios, process controls, response capabilities and strategies, 
available resources and estimates of potential event impacts and ostensibly 
represent the best possible solutions. Onsite and offsite responders rely heavily 
on contingency plans and regardless of whether they have confidence in them, 
there is little else to go on for information or preparation. 
Chapter 5 of this study, Analysis of Risk Perception and Defining Worst-
Case Scenarios, examined how emergency response insiders tend to disregard 
the mandatory scenarios as either too extreme or insufficient, attempting instead 
to define "realistic" events by relying on "common sense." The resulting conflicts 
over what that term means and whose version is correct drive political and 
scientific power struggles heavily reliant on experts and lead to few if any 
mutually satisfactory conclusions. From analysis in Chapter 5, it is apparent that 
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planners and responders are deeply divided and the most significant component 
of the planning process, what to plan for, is vulnerable to what seems the 
simplest of questions: What makes sense? Regardless of whose version of 
common sense wins out, the selection of scenarios sets the stage for all of the 
planning that follows. 
From a "scenario pool" filled with potential events, planners must evaluate 
and select those deemed appropriate. This chapter examines that process by 
addressing the second of two research questions: How does risk perception drive 
contingency planning? To gain a better understanding of this process, 
respondents were asked questions regarding incorporation of risk perception into 
contingency plans; use and adequacy of regulations as a basis for planning and 
response; adequacy and efficacy of contingency plans; the role of the public in 
planning and response; and recommendations for improvement. As in Chapter 
5, the often-candid responses to these questions provided the researcher with an 
intimate look at the respective points of view of the participants. Again, as in 
Chapter 5, prior to any formal analysis the influence of several sociological 
theories of organizational deviance was apparent. This chapter is grouped into 
five themes that emerged from analysis of the data and which seemed to fairly 
describe the essence of the particular topic: Making the Cut, Filling in the Blanks; 
They Won't Do the Work; Fantasy Documents; and The Fix, concluding with 
Summary of Risk Perception as a Driver for Contingency Planning, which briefly 
summarizes the analysis and critical points made in the chapter. 
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Making the Cut 
Respondents were asked questions regarding the process by which potential 
scenarios are selected from the "scenario pool" and eventually incorporated into 
planning, training and exercises, which they frequently referred to as "making the 
cut." They displayed near-consensus on the inclusion of only those deemed 
"realistic" or "credible" as presented in Experience and Common Sense in 
Chapter 5. "If we think it might happen, we put it in" was a typical sentiment, and 
some respondents referenced "case studies" as key when attempting to 
determine potential severity and probability. 
Mutually acceptable "benchmark events" continue to be the goal of nearly 
all of the respondents, but defining them remains elusive and controversial, 
particularly since there is little agreement across or even within between 
respondent groups. A few Local Emergency Responders felt that the key to "the 
right type and amount of planning" was to focus on specific hazards to specific 
communities, relying heavily on public information and awareness to ensure 
proper response, like shelter-in-place. In this way, they said, "We keep the 
reality level where it should be." 
Many respondents noted that regardless of which scenarios are selected, 
debate continues over not only whether the scenarios are appropriate, but also 
whether the contingency plan will adequately address them since "big ones can 
really only be exercised on paper." While reflecting concerns over the adequacy 
of scenarios, this also demonstrates a larger concern over the adequacy of 
contingency plans, which is examined in Filling in the Blanks within this chapter. 
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All respondents agreed that worst-case scenarios as prescribed by the 
Risk Management Program must be included regardless of whether they were 
deemed credible by the group. Several Local Emergency Responders noted that 
those were merely a formality since "no one can handle worst-case scenarios 
anyway." A few On-Scene Coordinators indicated that more time spent on 
"prevention and planning" would alleviate the need for "worst-case scenarios or 
that mindset," clarifying that the referenced "prevention and planning" should 
focus on lesser, more common events, which would avoid the distraction of 
paying excessive attention to "extremely remote possibilities." Several 
respondents from all groups generally agreed that "textbook scenarios must be 
adjusted with your own opinions, otherwise you will have low credibility and be 
seen as unrealistic." 
Most respondents openly expressed a tendency to minimize consideration 
of those scenarios, following the arguments put forth in Predicting the 
Unpredictable in Chapter 5, focusing instead on "alternative scenarios" allowed 
by the Risk Management Program regulations. However, alternative scenarios 
are developed by facility risk managers based entirely on their judgment of site 
conditions, controls and accident experience, and tend to be far less severe than 
the mandatory worst-case scenarios. Outside of Environmental, Health and 
Safety respondents, most felt that looking only at alternative scenarios would 
shift the focus to "less strenuous exercise for them [facilities]." This illustrates the 
conflict between groups over definition and common sense, marking the "middle 
ground where the battle is fought," referring to the mutually acceptable 
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"benchmark scenarios" that all respondents reportedly seek. A lone dissenter felt 
that worst-case Risk Management Plan scenarios should be incorporated "by the 
book, with no room for personal opinion," eliminating arguments over definition. 
As relative outsiders "operating from a distance," On-Scene Coordinators 
were strongly and evenly divided on their perceived roles in developing and 
selecting scenarios for consideration by Local Emergency Responders and 
Environmental, Health and Safety respondents. Some advised "injecting 
ourselves into the process and promoting group input" since they saw their role 
as "helping the audience, and they need to be open to every possibility." Others 
felt that the role of an On-Scene Coordinator was "to help only when needed, but 
not dictate," giving input only after "the facility does their homework and wants to 
supplement their plan," indicating an acknowledgement of the assumed lead role 
of the Environmental, Health and Safety respondent organization in defining risk 
and acceptability (Clarke 1988). A third On-Scene Coordinator group felt that 
they had no role at all in the process, stating that they "don't believe in worst-
case scenarios since they never happen." These individuals advised that 
planners should seek only limited outside input and "do the minimum required" 
for such scenarios, focusing instead on "ones that can really happen," clearly 
demonstrating Clarke's (1993) notion of disqualification. 
Local Emergency Responders and Environmental, Health and Safety 
respondents were likewise mixed on the role of input from On-Scene 
Coordinators. Local Emergency Responders generally welcomed input, but 
acknowledged that since opportunities for direct contact with State and Federal 
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personnel were limited, the On-Scene Coordinator would practically be limited to 
only a review role. 
Environmental, Health and Safety respondents generally felt that On-
Scene Coordinators should and did properly assume a role limited to 
administrative review of contingency plans developed at "the local level." They 
argue that since Risk Management Program regulations dictate planning and 
scenario boundaries, and alternative scenarios are heavily dependent on local 
considerations and site conditions proposed and debated at the local level, On-
Scene Coordinators could offer little in the way of practical insight. While 
possibly correct from a logistical perspective, such an exclusion of input, even 
willingly on the part of many On-Scene Coordinators, results in limited overview 
of the process and increases opportunities for disqualification and a dominant 
role of Environmental, Health and Safety respondent organizations in defining 
risk (Clarke 1988; 1993). 
Several Local Emergency Responders indicated that once facilities 
determine what constitutes worst-case scenarios and incorporate these into the 
contingency plans, "everyone else really just reacts to their information and tries 
to manage the possibilities" through the Area Contingency Plans. These 
respondents candidly remarked that in the end, the Area Plans reflect "doing 
what we can with what we've got," particularly in the face of "the 51 percent vote" 
of senior Emergency Managers. Describing this "51 percent vote" created 
discomfort for respondents and a test of the trust between participant and 
researcher. On a professional level, most of these individuals simply did not like 
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airing "dirty laundry." On a more basic level, many of them were aware that the 
researcher knew their supervisors and co-workers. They were visibly guarded 
about making comments that might "lead back to them through their bosses." 
During this dialogue, each of them watched the researcher intently to get a read 
on whether they should worry. No one had to ask and no one did. It was simply 
understood that the matter would not come up again outside the pages of this 
project. As discussed in others portions of this study, this type of dialogue was 
precisely why the robust confidentiality measures were needed. As with other 
topics of discussion, the researcher is certain that the existing relationships and 
his knowledge of the topic encouraged the frank discussions. 
As in other responses, "surprises" continued to be a common concern 
among all except for Environmental, Health and Safety respondents. Regardless 
of the concerns voiced over "surprises" during responses at facilities, a few Local 
Emergency Responders indicated "Transportation events are the worst due to 
high frequency and unpredictable quantities and conditions, which makes them 
almost impossible to anticipate." Others strongly disagreed, noting that although 
transportation events "might occur any time and any place," they were much 
smaller in scope and quicker and easier to bring to conclusion. 
On whether selecting scenarios from "the pool" and focusing on those 
reflected a true incorporation of risk perception into the process, most 
respondents replied that it was "only a reasonable effort" and was "as good as it 
gets" given the constraints of politics, time and resources. However, one 
Environmental, Health and Safety respondent went further, feeling that the best 
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incorporation of risk perception into planning activities would be to show enough 
concern to practice the plan, test contact numbers and communications 
equipment, have biannual meetings with offsite responders to evaluate site 
conditions and transfer information, conduct drills and most importantly, "be 
selective when designating response leaders." The importance of having the 
"right" response leaders was echoed by all other respondents, particularly as it 
was related to making good, fast decisions, but most importantly for many Local 
Emergency Responders and On-Scene Coordinators, being able to anticipate 
and react to changing conditions and the ubiquitous "surprises." Environmental, 
Health and Safety respondents tended to downplay the issue of surprises, 
instead proposing that it was simply necessary for a good manager to "be 
flexible" when necessary to "get the job done." 
In summary, respondents relied heavily on criteria of "realistic" or 
"credible" when determining whether potential scenarios would "make the cut" 
and be included in planning and exercises. However, the goal of mutually 
acceptable "benchmark events" remains elusive as respondents voiced opposing 
opinions on "the middle ground" between the "extreme" Risk Management Plan 
scenarios and the minimal-impact alternative scenarios put forth by 
Environmental, Health and Safety respondent organizations. As for incorporating 
outside input into the process, opinions of On-Scene Coordinators were evenly 
divided between active engagement, input only upon request and minimal to 
none. Local Emergency Responders described fighting the "51 percent vote" of 
senior Emergency Managers and the constant threat of surprises, indicating that 
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considering politics and the constraints of time and resources, this is "as good as 
it gets." Logistics and distance necessarily limited input into the local process by 
On-Scene Coordinators, which Local Emergency Responders reluctantly 
accepted, but Environmental, Health and Safety respondents saw as appropriate 
due to their limited potential insights into a "local process." All respondents 
agreed that regardless of the scenarios chosen and the plans made, having the 
"right" leader was key to a successful response, particularly when faced with 
changing conditions or surprises. 
Filling in the Blanks 
Planning and emergency response activities are required and framed by 
regulatory requirements, but those requirements do not provide detailed 
guidance for every activity or situation. Instead as examined in Chapter 2, 
Regulatory Background, they generally require or provide only a basic 
framework, specifying for example that an appropriate Site Safety Plan with 
certain components is developed for emergency response activities. The precise 
details of what goes into that Safety Plan are left to those developing it, but will 
rely heavily on other regulatory requirements, resource constraints, site 
conditions and perhaps most importantly, experience of the involved individuals. 
To gain a better understanding of the regulation/planning dynamic, 
respondents were asked questions regarding the adequacy of regulations as a 
basis for their planning and emergency response, and their views on the 
perceived flexibility or burden of "filling in the blanks and getting the job done." 
Without question, the most frequent and immediate response from respondents 
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in any group regarding regulations as an adequate foundation was an emphatic 
"They suck," with little or no elaboration. Mannerisms clearly indicated a feeling 
of "You had to ask?" aimed at the researcher as if so obvious as to need no 
question, and certainly no answer. Interestingly, upon further discussion this 
near-universal reaction was found to represent two sharply opposing views: the 
majority, who felt that regulations clearly went too far versus those who felt just 
as strongly that regulations fell short and must do more. The "too far" group 
knew that a rollback of regulatory framework is unlikely and worried that they 
might be perceived as simply trying to escape doing a good job. The "do more" 
group expressed some nervousness over the potential ramifications of asking for 
more regulations, knowing that the results might be inflexible blanket approaches 
and likely not the surgical solutions they envisioned. In either case, both groups 
generally concluded that everyone might be better off simply continuing to "fill in 
the blanks" and improvise under the current system, fearing that substantial 
changes might be worse. 
Environmental, Health and Safety respondents were mixed in their views 
on the regulatory foundation. Most generally described regulations as "too rigid" 
or "complicated," noting that such a structure forces the creation of "bulky and 
complex contingency plans" which "prohibits flexibility" and prevents innovative or 
more cost-effective solutions that might be available. A minority view held that 
adequacy of regulations depends on the particular facility, observing that "The 
higher the risk, the more variables you have, and the less effective the 
regulations." This was clarified as referring to "filling in the blanks and doing 
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what it takes," putting the burden of defining and managing risk directly on the 
company. Ultimately, they said, "Some are willing to spend the money to meet 
the spirit of the law, and others are interested only in legal compliance and lower 
expenses." Several described planning and emergency response regulations as 
"a good driver" for the planning process, assigning "some value" in requiring 
communication with emergency responders, but overall ranking them as "a poor 
foundation," too complex and sometimes even contradictory. A common 
complaint from this Environmental, Health and Safety respondent group was that 
"Right-to-Know information is not secure enough," adding to the risk of "outside 
actions" through exploitation of published contingency plans and related 
information. 
While Local Emergency Responders generally expressed empathy for the 
complexity and burdens placed upon reporting facilities, most agreed, "Right-to-
Know was good for us. It gave firefighters information about hazards." Beyond 
that, this group was completely divided on whether the regulatory structure was 
adequate to "get what we need" and the reasons for that. One felt that 
regulations are "adequate for everything except OCAs [Offsite Consequence 
Analyses], because they only require identification of potential impacts and no 
reduction or prevention. This does not really protect anyone, and the regs 
[regulations] should watch out for people first." A second felt that regulations are 
adequate, but need to be better enforced, which would "make facilities pay more 
attention to the overall issue of safety and preparedness." This individual wanted 
Local Emergency Responders to have more oversight, "because we have no real 
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input or control, only review and react and it means we have to take most 
everything on faith," referring to ongoing concerns over vulnerability to recreancy 
(Freudenburg 1993). A third felt that regulations "are not very adequate" as a 
planning and response tool even though "they are really pretty minimal and not 
that hard to do." He concludes that most facilities "are either just not committed 
or have to choose between making or spending money," illustrating public 
interest losing out to competing interests (Vaughan 1992; 1996; Meyer and 
Rowan 1991). A fourth expressed concern that "If regulations were all we had to 
go by, it would handcuff us," explaining that the current structure allows no 
flexibility, forces preparation for extreme events and measures and gives no 
quarter when it comes to enforcement. He warned, "If tunnel vision and rituals 
are what you want, be careful what you wish for, you just might get it." A fifth felt 
that "Contingency plans are only partially effective, and for some it is a hardship 
even to comply" because regulations are seen as subjective and vague. A sixth 
wanted "to see regulations get tighter" and more specific about planning, worst-
case scenarios and public involvement. He felt that this would eliminate many 
"gray areas where we have to just fill in the blanks, since all these different 
opinions just make that harder." A seventh Local Emergency Responder 
deferred the issue to "the facilities" since in his view, "The regulations require 
facilities to do most of the analysis and planning anyway, so whether they are 
adequate is really for them to decide," adding "But it would probably help to 
require more planning for bigger events." His deference to the subject facilities 
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falls directly in line with Clarke's (1988) notion of the organizational capture of 
this role. 
On-Scene Coordinators, like the Local Emergency Responders generally 
acknowledged that regulatory requirements create a significant burden on 
affected facilities, and a common complaint was that regulations are adequate 
but confusing because "Lawyers wrote these things. They are not user friendly 
and are difficult to really understand and comply with." Empathy aside, most 
echoed the need for good planning as expressed by one respondent: "The 
current regulations are overwhelming and I wouldn't want to be them [facilities] 
but the fact is that simple compliance is not enough. Facilities must go beyond 
that and regulate themselves to a higher standard." One respondent in this 
group had serious issues with the focus on planning based on listed chemicals 
and thresholds, stating "it is unrealistic to limit planning to listed chemicals and 
thresholds, since this exempts many dangerous process and chemicals. Many 
facilities investigated for fatalities and large releases are exempt from RMP [Risk 
Management Program] and other regulations." He felt that public perception and 
"regulatory obsession with unrealistic Worst-Case Scenarios" force complex 
work-arounds at facilities in an effort to be exempted, increasing hazards from 
handling smaller amounts of chemicals more frequently. In his view the current 
system promotes Hazard Analysis of predefined Worst-Case Scenarios over 
prevention and preparedness for lesser, more realistic events "which should 
really be the focus." Others argued that while some regulations "are more robust 
than others, some are simply overkill." They explained that as "only a start" in 
RISK PERCEPTION 97 
the planning process, regulations provide a good structure for plans, but "a plan 
is much more than just a written document and cannot tell you everything you 
need to do." A good contingency plan "must recognize and address relationships 
and people skills" by using "common sense and the real world to fill in the gaps." 
If these factors are not considered, in their view "This is how a facility can comply 
with regulations and still have a poor program." Echoing most of the concerns 
expressed by the Federal On-Scene Coordinators, the State On-Scene 
Coordinators in this group rated the current regulatory structure as a poor 
foundation citing "too many gray areas, too many exemptions and lack of 
enforcement" as the key failures. They also expressed concerns that the 
regulatory structure lays out many mandates but no funding to complete them 
adequately. Because of this, they felt that Local Emergency Planning 
Committees "cannot really be active and Plans sit on shelves." 
In summary, many respondents across groups described planning and 
emergency response regulations as complex, burdensome, vague, ineffective or 
even sometimes contradictory, while others defended them saying that although 
definitely a burden such regulations are necessary "to make it happen." All 
agreed that regulations "usually do not address every issue, nor should they try," 
and there was near consensus that regulations "are usually open for 
interpretation," leading to conflict between parties, particularly EPA and subject 
facilities. Many respondents from all groups observed that ultimately "the facility 
must address its own problems in the way best for it," indicating a reliance on the 
Environmental, Health and Safety respondent organizations to assume the lead 
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role in this risk management process, falling directly in line with Clarke's (1988) 
notion of the organizational capture of that role. It is clear that for these risk 
management respondents existing regulations can only provide a framework 
within which a great deal of "filling in the blanks" must occur. It is equally clear 
that within these "blanks" is where battles are fought over "common sense," 
"reasonable" and "adequate." The outputs of those battles are institutionalized 
by the winners within the published contingency plans on which all other planning 
activities depend. 
They Won't Do the Work 
Potentially the key points of input into the planning and emergency response 
process for the general public are mechanisms provided by the Emergency 
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) as discussed in Chapter 2, 
Regulatory Background. Commonly referred to within these respondent groups 
simply as "Right-to-Know," EPCRA provides local communities open access to 
information about chemical hazards and emergency response capabilities within 
their areas (United States Environmental Protection Agency 2001 c). When 
asked questions regarding the role of the public in the planning and emergency 
response process, respondents generally agreed that the public does have some 
role, but differed strongly over the scope and value of that role. They were united 
in their opinions that whatever that role may be, the public generally makes little 
or no effort to assert it. 
Environmental, Health and Safety respondents tended to express the 
importance of public input and place a high value on interfacing and responding 
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to the concerns of "their neighbors." One stated bluntly, "The public can put us 
out of business and they must be part of our plans. This is why we know our 
neighbors and have notification plans, to protect them in case of an emergency." 
A second echoed that position, noting that "Our doors are always open and we 
are sensitive to their expectations. We understand our obligation to be good 
neighbors." Others commented, 'We want our neighbors to be comfortable with 
what we do and how we do it." When asked to describe specific avenues for 
public input or oversight and the types and amount of information that might be 
shared, this group as a whole relied on EPCRA Right-to-Know mechanisms, 
voicing positions such as 'We comply with Right-to-Know and the public has 
input through the LEPC [Local Emergency Planning Committee] and other 
forums designed for this." 
Since Right-to-Know information is limited in scope and entirely dependent 
on the facility that generated it, respondents in this group were asked whether or 
how the public might be able to get additional information or participate in the 
internal planning process. Most indicated that outside of public relations and 
Right-to-Know reporting, "there are no real mechanisms for direct input at our 
facility," adding that 'We work with community ER [emergency response] 
personnel as much as possible." Some remarked on the level of difficulty of this 
process, noting that while "useful" input is welcome, "these are complex issues 
not easily grasped from outside." When asked to relate how limited access and 
the apparently high level of complexity supported the generally expressed "open 
door" policy, the consensus position reflected that of one respondent: "They are 
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free to inquire at any time and we will tell them as much as we can about our 
process and plans, within the limits of legal and security constraints." 
With one exception, Local Emergency Responders generally expressed 
the need for strong public input since "We do all of this for them," and "The public 
is the driving force. Everything we do is about how it affects them." The lone 
dissenter felt that due to "their lack of knowledge of the subject, the public has no 
role in the planning process." He did however, feel that "they do need to be 
notified of events and releases that might affect them." One other respondent in 
this group would limit public input to only those "potentially impacted." That 
group he said "has a key role in all aspects," but if not a vulnerable population, 
"they have no role at all." As a group, these respondents agreed that "Our goal is 
life first, so the public must be aware and prepared." A major point of concern for 
this group was the apparent "apathy" on the part of the general public regarding 
the planning process. One respondent noted, "They [the public] usually don't 
care until there's an alarm. They need to be totally involved, and could be, but 
they won't. I don't know why." Another observed, "The public is important and 
should be involved, but they won't do the work to make a good product. They 
never care until something is wrong, and then they want a quick, simple fix that 
makes them totally happy." Others agreed, expressing their frustration that 'We 
try every way we can to get the public involved, but it's not a threat to them on 
the day of the meeting," adding that "Of course everyone wants to be involved 
after the event, but then they are so emotional it's not productive." On whether 
this apparent lack of interaction might imply trust whether than apathy, one 
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remarked, "It's not really trust. It's more like 'that's your job', so it's not their 
problem. They just expect us to handle it," a view echoed by the entire group. 
On-Scene Coordinators generally expressed similar disenchantment with 
the apparent lack of public interest "on the front end." Many in this group 
commented on the "sometimes-contentious" nature of working with the public, 
but maintained that it was necessary or "paramount" even though it might 
sometimes be "politically uncomfortable." As with certain Local Emergency 
Responders, some within this group took a paternal position on public input, 
feeling that the public fit into the process "only on the tail end, once the plan is 
developed and in place," since at that point, they would reportedly be more able 
to gain awareness and a comfort level. One insisted, "The public has a right to 
know about hazards, but no role in defining 'safe'. That is for the response 
experts to determine and explain." As for what then to do with the information, 
he declared, "Then the community can judge whether that is 'safe enough for 
them', with the DEM [Disaster and Emergency Manager] person(s) as their 
voice." 
One On-Scene Coordinator expressed shock at the notion that residents 
would simply continue to complain in the face of perceived danger while waiting 
for someone else to rectify the situation. Offering a piece of candid advice, "If 
you don't feel safe, you shouldn't live there," he described how in his view people 
must take action for themselves if they truly feel endangered. He felt that many 
times, residents might describe feeling powerless, but always had the option to 
simply move. Since many times "the facilities were there first," neighbors needed 
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to remember that when they buy a house or rent an apartment. He did not 
consider the financial and social constraints of such a decision to be of practical 
concern. Fairness of the matter aside, he described little sympathy for those who 
simply complained instead of acted to "get out of harms way." 
Another respondent in this group would limit input to only "directly affected 
stakeholders" noting that "they must have a role, but not all of them are an asset 
to the process because of low awareness and personal or political agendas." He 
suggested that this could be improved with education and greater involvement in 
the process, but "beyond that, the general unaffected public has no role." 
There was general agreement that the public expects that facilities are 
safe and will "do the right thing if something happens," and a stated need for the 
public to understand their role and participate as needed in evacuations and 
shelters-in-place. Otherwise, these respondents said, "The emergency 
responders cannot do their job." 
On the issue of trust versus apathy as an explanation for the apparent lack 
of interest on the part of the public, opinions were mixed. Some felt that the 
public has a relatively high level of trust in government and facility planners and . 
emergency responders, validated by the "relatively good historical record." This 
was said by several to be "OK because we all trust our lives everyday to people 
we don't know." Others disagreed, placing the blame squarely on apathy, 
insisting that the public has and deserves no role in the planning process 
because "After 16 years of Right-to-Know, 99.9 percent of the public has no clue 
and could not care less." One respondent combined the two, observing, "Trust 
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and apathy are why the information clampdown after 9/11 was no real loss," 
referring to the removal of most Risk Management and contingency planning 
information from public access websites. Overall, On-Scene Coordinators 
concurred with one who stated, "The public fits into our work big time, but doesn't 
understand us or what we do." The consensus position of this group was that 
planners and emergency responders have to share information, educate the 
public and the media and be sensitive to everyone's needs, "all while doing high 
visibility work under the threat of liability and lawsuits." 
In summary, while respondents in all groups generally agreed that the 
public has a role in the planning and emergency response process, they differed 
strongly on what that role should be, ranging from "every aspect" to "none." 
Public interaction was often described as difficult or contentious, and there was a 
tendency toward a paternal role on the part of some of these insider 
respondents, relegating the public primarily to a reactive role of evacuating or 
taking other measures when told to do so. Though afforded the opportunity to 
interact via Right-to-Know mechanisms such as Local Emergency Planning 
Committees, the general public is reportedly effectively absent from the process, 
and respondents debated whether this was a function of apathy or trust or both. 
Environmental, Health and Safety respondents generally referred to a desire to 
be "good neighbors" with an "open door" policy when dealing with the public, but 
tended to describe interactions based on complying with specific requests for 
information, not interactive planning activities. They typically indicated that 
requests would be honored within the bounds of safety and security concerns, 
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and relied upon Local Emergency Planning Committee meetings and annual 
reporting of Right-to-Know data as the primary form of "interaction." 
Respondents from all groups frequently referred to "complex processes" 
and the feeling of ''what we do not being understood" by the outsiders, 
specifically the public. The resulting lack of interaction on the part of the public 
implies the influence of Freudenburg's (1993) notion of reliance on others 
"performing the necessary calculations" (p. 913). This dependence seems 
encouraged by a "relatively good historical record," which reinforces the 
perception of accidents as rare events (Gephart 1984), ostensibly validating the 
past and future relegation of planning to "the experts." Such a relationship 
appears to demonstrate Clarke and Short's (1993) notion that the greatest 
influences on social policy come from interest groups, setting the stage for 
organizations to assume the role of defining risk (Clarke 1988). 
Fantasy Documents 
Respondents were asked questions regarding both the adequacy of published 
contingency plans as related to the planning and response process and their 
individual roles in developing and implementing those Plans. Although displaying 
strong consensus that contingency plans were nearly always detailed, well-
written and compliant with applicable regulations, respondents were deeply 
divided on the question of adequacy for the intended purpose. The reasons for 
this varied, often divided along group lines, but clearly there was little affection 
shown by anyone toward these documents. On the subject of individual roles in 
development and implementation, lines were clearly drawn between groups. 
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Facility contingency plans are authored and implemented internally by the 
respective Environmental, Health and Safety respondent organizations, with little 
or no outside input. Review of these Plans by Local Emergency Responders or 
On-Scene Coordinators occurs only upon request, described by all as "very rare" 
outside of regulatory clarification, or following an incident that calls for 
investigation by relevant agencies. Area Contingency Plans, however, are 
developed and implemented primarily by Local Emergency Responders with 
equal opportunity for outside input from both the public and Environmental, 
Health and Safety respondents, and are heavily dependent on existing Facility 
contingency plans for scope and content. This information dependency 
illustrates Clarke's (1988) notion of the lead role of organizations in defining 
"acceptable risk" as opposed to the public, and the vulnerability of the process to 
disqualification (Clarke 1993) and recreancy (Freudenburg 1993) at the 
organizational level. 
As a group, On-Scene Coordinators described their role in either Area or 
Facility contingency plan development as "indirect" and only for "technical 
clarification," mainly consisting of verifying that the Plans are "technically 
complete," meaning that "all the pieces are there," viewed by all as "far different 
than 'adequate'." A common observation from this group: "As long as it meets 
the regulations, they can write the plans as they see fit, and it is up to them to 
make sure it is workable and adequate," again demonstrating the vulnerability of 
the process to organizational capture of the role of defining risk (Clarke 1988). 
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Environmental, Health and Safety respondents tended to characterize 
their r(;)spective contingency plans as "compliant with the law" and avoided 
concluding whether they were adequate for the intended use. Some responded 
rhetorically, 'What is adequate?" noting that their goal is always to "meet or 
exceed all applicable requirements." As a group, Environmental, Health and 
Safety respondents described thorough, well thought out plans that address 
every reasonable contingency, noting that doing so requires extensive reviews, 
compliance with internal and industry good management practices, training and 
devotion of resources to "make every effort" in ensuring that the contingency 
plans "meet expectations." Whether that would pass for "adequate," they felt, "is 
open for debate by anyone trying to define that." However, what they generally 
felt was not open for debate was the extraordinary economic and social burden 
of developing and maintaining contingency plans to deal with "completely unlikely 
events." In many cases, they argued, routine internal practices would be more 
than adequate, but regulations forced them to devote resources "where they 
were not really needed" and trapped them into what Meyer and Rowan (1991) 
described as rituals, myths and abstract structures where claimed practices 
conflicted with requirements for efficiency. 
Local Emergency Responders and On-Scene Coordinators expressed 
skepticism over the value of these documents, with some voicing strong opinions 
that "most contingency plans are worthless to begin with," and that "Emergency 
Managers are not running to get them during emergencies." Several described 
contingency plans as "really just a lot of paper written because facilities have to 
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do it," and made frequent references to that being "a waste of time and effort" 
since once written, "they just go up on a shelf and no one reads them." 
Contingency plans were frequently described by this group as "overwritten 
volumes of boilerplate, with too much narrative and filler" written to satisfy 
regulators. One Local Emergency Responder candidly summarized the views of 
his counterparts saying, "I haven't looked at a lot of them, and if anybody else 
has, I don't know who they are. We are more interested in just knowing who we 
will be calling at 0300." Environmental, Health and Safety respondents generally 
agreed that contingency plans tended to be large, complex documents, but noted 
that although they attempted to keep them as simple as possible, "these are 
complex facilities" and regulations are very specific about "what goes in." 
Several Local Emergency Responders and On-Scene Coordinators 
recounted examples of practices claimed in planning and training being 
abandoned during emergencies due to resource limitations, urgency or simply 
"because the plan did not address what we were having to deal with." Regarding 
this issue of "sticking to the Plan," many respondents across groups argued that 
contingency plans should focus only on "fundamentals such as your individual 
responsibilities," describing those as "whom to call and when, and the ability and 
authority to authorize and organize resources." Others concurred, adding that 
the best plans "say the least and give leeway to improvise." A frequently cited, 
highly prized characteristic of "having the right guy in charge" was the ability to 
"know when the Plan isn't working" and the willingness to "do whatever it takes," 
particularly if that required going outside of or even "against the Plan." When 
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asked whether the apparently frequent need for this particular talent indicated a 
fundamental problem with existing contingency plans, respondents were highly 
divided. Nearly all Local Emergency Responders and On-Scene Coordinators 
pointed to "scaled down scenarios" and the reliance on facilities to describe 
"worst-case" as necessarily resulting in "surprises," while several Environmental, 
Health and Safety respondents insisted that "although the Plans might not be 
perfect, they are as good as we can make them," pointing out that "no plan can 
anticipate everything." The argument between these groups appears to continue 
to be over surprises as the result of "failures of foresight" (Turner 1976) and 
disqualification (Clarke 1993), as described by Local Emergency Responders 
and On-Scene Coordinators, or simply the result of "changing conditions" and a 
need "to be flexible" as described by Environmental, Health and Safety 
respondents. In either case it is clear that contingency plans are not considered 
by offsite users as reliable indicators of what to expect during significant events, 
who note that "everything always works great on paper, but we never know until 
we get there whether it was enough." 
While still discounting their ultimate value, many Local Emergency 
Responders and On-Scene Coordinators acknowledged a distinction between 
the quality and adequacy of contingency plans from various facilities, describing 
Plans from "the big guys" as much better than others, because of the ability to 
"devote inordinate resources to redundant systems" and practice "extreme 
planning." In some cases this was thought to be due to corporate philosophy and 
the priority place on those programs, however it was generally attributed to 
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"being afraid of EPA." Oil companies were said to be "more capable than 
chemical companies," producing much better contingency plans and training 
programs primarily due to extensive experience with large events such as Exxon 
Valdez. One On-Scene Coordinator noted that "They [chemical companies] just 
don't get that they need to do more than everybody else," referring to what he 
and others described as inherently greater hazards at chemical facilities. 
Overall, this group felt that regardless of whether it was "the little guy who 
ignores or doesn't know the regulations," poor corporate culture or simple 
inability to "predict the future," most contingency plans "fall far short of adequate." 
An apparently common practice of using outside consultants to develop 
facility contingency plans was a point of contention for many Local Emergency 
Responders and On-Scene Coordinators. Reportedly, outside consultants might 
visit the site "for only a day," gathering "only enough 'intel' to fill in the blanks" 
without seriously engaging facility personnel or developing a real understanding 
of the site, its processes and culture. The resulting lack of verification of field 
conditions and limited understanding of "what really needs to happen" was cited 
by this group as a primary reason why "many Plans look good on paper, but fail 
miserably" during an event when conflicts between operating procedures and 
published Plans create confusion, delay response activities and ultimately result 
in failure and regulatory penalties. 
These respondents generally divided such failures into two groups. In the 
first group, contingency plans present capabilities as greater than actual, giving 
facilities undeserved credibility and confidence and "setting them and us up for 
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failure." In the second group, contingency plans apparently impede facilities that 
may have very good internal practices by burdening them with responsibilities 
and commitments different from their routine. Such a contingency plan 
"interferes with a response that might actually succeed if the Plan doesn't get in 
the way." The former clearly falls in line with Meyer and Rowan's (1991) notion 
of gaining legitimacy through structure. However, if as most Local Emergency 
Responders and On-Scene Coordinators presume that contingency plans are not 
deliberately and maliciously "inadequate," Clarke's (1999) notion of "fantasy 
documents" goes far in explaining how planning becomes an exercise in self-
deception. Planners bring order to a complex process by the implied 
consideration and control of every variable, and within this process Turner's 
(1976) over-reliance on subcontractors, Vaughan's (1999) "routine 
nonconformity" (p. 271) and Clarke's (1993) disqualification heuristic are clearly 
active. 
Environmental, Health and Safety respondents defended the extensive 
use of outside contractors, indicating that the firms "bring outside eyes to the 
process" and are objective in their findings. Using such firms, they argue, 
promotes consistency and adherence to high standards in planning for numerous 
facilities spread over great distances. Local Emergency Responders and On-
Scene Coordinators agreed that this might be true in theory, but noted that it also 
supported their argument of contingency plans as "volumes of boilerplate 
language" that are "not functional" and are "always well written but hardly ever 
adequate." 
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Regarding whether the focus of contingency plans should be on onsite or 
offsite impacts, respondents were united in their stated goal of focusing on both. 
However, they were deeply divided on why that was not actually the practice. 
Local Emergency Responders and On-Scene Coordinators generally felt that 
contingency plans reflect "what the facilities feel is important," qualifying that as 
"usually from the fenceline in." They described a tendency for facilities to rely 
heavily, if not entirely on offsite responders to "take care of things outside the 
fence," reducing that part of the contingency plan to simple generalizations and 
expectations of response agency actions with no real commitment or thought to 
whether "we really have a chance to do all this." A frequent example was lack of 
warning time, which often precludes immediate actions by anyone, particularly 
across large areas. Faced with such constraints and an obligation to protect the 
public first, "that is exactly what we try to do" by concentrating planning efforts 
"outside the fence" and leaving the facilities to "worry about themselves." 
Environmental, Health and Safety respondents noted that attention paid to 
"inside the fence" issues was indeed protective of the public, since "we are the 
first line of defense," and the high level of effort put forth internally supports that 
goal. Local Emergency Responders and On-Scene Coordinators agreed in 
principle, but again expressed concerns that contingency plan failures, 
overconfidence of and in facility responders and unexpected or disqualified 
scenarios create the "bad surprises which get us every time." 
In summary, although no respondents specifically labeled contingency 
plans as "fantasy documents" (Clarke 1999; Clark and Perrow 1996), the 
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characteristics of this sociological theory are precisely what are being described. 
These well written, detailed documents are compliant with all applicable 
regulations and seem to promise order and control, but are universally dismissed 
by Local Emergency Responders and On-Scene Coordinators as "paper 
exercises" and "basically worthless:" Reliance on consultants to develop 
contingency plans is a major point of contention between groups, with Local 
Emergency Responders and On-Scene Coordinators seeing the detached 
"cookie-cutter" approach by "outside experts" as a major weakness leading to 
poor Plans, while Environmental, Health and Safety respondents promote 
consultants as adding consistency and objectivity to the process. Offsite 
responders generally dismissed reliability of contingency plans, with the ability to 
recognize or anticipate Plan failures and "go to Plan B" considered by all 
respondents a critical characteristic of "having the right guy in charge." Most 
respondents advocated simple, role-oriented contingency plans that allow key 
decision makers leeway to do whatever is needed, while debating whether that 
flexibility was so frequently necessary due to poor planning or "changing 
conditions." There was also strong disagreement over whether facilities 
overemphasize "inside the fence" planning and whether offsite responders 
conversely obsess over "outside the fence" impacts. In the end, what seems to 
be illustrated is the failure of attempts to "control the uncontrollable" (Clarke 
1999:171) by way of a written document that necessarily cannot reflect every 
possibility, but in effect creates the illusion that exactly that goal has been 
achieved. 
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The Fix 
At the end of each interview, respondents were asked for their recommendations 
for program changes. The researcher qualified this to indicate not "just making 
the process smoother or less expensive" for themselves, but changes that would 
lower risk and increase the success of planning and emergency response for 
everyone involved. Obviously each respondent was free to interpret this as they 
saw fit, but the stated goal was to examine "big picture" solutions. "Big picture" 
aside, recommendations varied widely and tended to be divided along group 
lines, as did many responses to other questions addressed in this study. 
Environmental, Health and Safety respondents tended to focus on two 
major areas for program improvement. The first was the need to "stop scaring 
the public" with the current "blanket" regulatory approach to worst-case scenarios 
and Offsite Consequence Analyses. Instead, they generally recommended that 
regulators needed to increase public awareness of "low risk and good safety 
programs" and to allow facilities more individual control over internal planning 
and prevention activities. This they felt would encourage more local interaction 
and a focus on "more realistic events," allowing facilities to implement cost-
effective, feasible contingency plans based on site-by-site analysis. The second 
recommended area for improvement was to "tighten Right-to-Know" access to 
information. They generally felt that current open and public access to scenarios 
and planning documents reveal too much information about the process and the 
response plan, making facilities, responders and adjacent populations vulnerable 
to outside actions. Some felt that the information should not be available to 
RISK PERCEPTION 114 
anyone outside of emergency response agencies. Another respondent in this 
group voiced a solitary opinion that measures should be taken by planners and 
regulators to limit encroachment of residences and offsite populations toward 
facilities, since this "might put people in harms way through no fault of ours." 
Another lone recommendation was to improve the process by "making safety a 
corporate culture since most accidents can be prevented." This respondent felt 
that in such a culture planning would be improved with practice and "always 
questioning the logic of the plan" by asking, 'When will this NOT work?" Most 
other Environmental, Health and Safety respondents responded that safety was 
already a very high priority at their facilities. 
Local Emergency Responders overwhelmingly referred to the need for 
more public involvement "earlier and at all steps" as the primary hope for 
program improvement, with several remarking that this was "the only way it will 
happen." They saw increased public awareness as demanding and generating 
better and more information, which would lead to more and better preparation, 
particularly, some noted, if "planning included scenarios where things don't go so 
well." As to how to generate this increased public interaction, few offered 
suggestions or expressed optimism, referring to issues already examined in They 
won't do the Work within this chapter. Several echoed this sentiment: "If the 
public wants better protection, they should show it by getting more involved. We 
can only do so much since we are responders, not lawyers." Regarding the 
often-stated negative role of lawyers, several respondents concurred that 
planning would be improved by involving "real-life people" in making regulations, 
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and not just "lawyers living in the Beltway." One Local Emergency Responder 
described this reported lack of opportunity for input "by anyone outside of 
Washington," saying, "Public involvement in the current rule-making structure is a 
joke. Ads are in tiny print behind the Obits and the government expects 
intelligent comments on huge programs in 30-45 days." He counts planning and 
emergency response personnel among the excluded, pointing out "Even 
professional groups like Firefighters and LEPCs [Local Emergency Planning 
Committees] don't receive direct notice. A lot of times we find out about changes 
by accident." 
These respondents generally shuddered at the notion of additional 
regulations, pleading "No more regulation, please!" They consistently reported 
that while most emergency responders are extremely dedicated and manage "to 
do what it takes to succeed," they need more "quality time" in training and 
exercises, preferably "onsite, practicing tactics." 
A few Local Emergency Responders indicated, "many of us have a sinking 
feeling about some facilities" due to "information overload" and a lack of time to 
"properly absorb and prepare," in line with Clarke and Short's (1993) notion of 
organizations generally having too much rather than not enough information. To 
alleviate this, they felt that they should be able to, but often cannot, rely on 
facilities "writing realistic plans and then doing what your plan says," but in their 
minds there is a simple solution: "If you can't do that, change your Plan or 
change what you're doing." One respondent felt that in addition to the other 
recommendations examined, response safety and effectiveness would be greatly 
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improved by releasing military technology for civilian use, since "they have a lot 
better stuff." 
On-Scene Coordinators were somewhat divided on recommendations. 
Some State On-Scene Coordinators promoted stronger enforcement of existing 
regulations, closing exemptions and loopholes and removing "gray areas." 
Others felt that program improvement would come from more public awareness, 
more Federal funding for regulatory mandates and pressure to increase 
involvement between affected parties via the Local Emergency Planning 
Committees. Such actions they claim would encourage "additional monitoring of 
incidents and actions taken" and raise public awareness and interest. Federal 
On-Scene Coordinators generally advocated "understanding and enforcing" 
existing requirements and tended to agree that additional regulations would help 
nothing, pointing out "Regulations have gone as far as they can." A few referred 
to a need for "clear-language versions," which they felt would reduce confusion 
for everyone involved. This group generally agreed that the best opportunity for 
improvement would be to recognize that a contingency plan is not the end of the 
process and should generate more questions than answers. Involved parties 
should answer those questions by exercising contingency plans at every 
opportunity. A common sentiment was "Use the plan. Don't just write it and 
shelve it." 
Regarding contingency plan content, several On-Scene Coordinators 
noted that facilities and agencies should be fair in assessing programs and 
capabilities, since overconfidence and embellishment only prolongs events and 
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increases risk for everyone. While acknowledging that they have less direct 
interaction with Local Emergency Responders and Environmental, Health and 
Safety respondent organizations than those groups have with each other, several 
On-Scene Coordinators maintained that increasing their involvement in the local 
planning process would add "fresh eyes" and improve it due to "our broad 
experiences" and resources. Several Federal On-Scene Coordinators agreed 
with their State counterparts in advocating a greater role for Local Emergency 
Planning Committees, promoting them as "the primary protection" since they are 
in the best position to interact with all interested parties. Additional funding was 
the most common recommendation for accomplishing this, as these mandated 
Committees are generally unfunded and all work performed by them is on a 
voluntary basis. 
In summary, with very few exceptions this insider group did not advocate 
additional regulations as a desirable option for program improvement, although 
some felt that better enforcement of existing programs was needed. Beyond the 
general distaste for a regulatory solution, there was little agreement between 
groups on any particular risk reduction and planning strategies. 
Recommendations varied widely and tended to be divided along group lines. 
Environmental, Health and Safety respondents generally voiced a need to 
"stop scaring the public" and promote public awareness of "low risk and good 
safety programs" while seeking more local and individual control over planning 
and prevention activities. Their second most frequent recommendation was to 
restrict "Right-to-Know" access to information to reduce exposure to outside acts. 
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Local Emergency Responders overwhelmingly advocated more public 
involvement as the primary, if not the only hope for improvement although none 
expressed optimism that the public would ever overcome the current perceived 
apathy to the entire process. As to how public involvement might be increased, 
this group generally voiced a need to reduce the "lawyer effect" and include "real-
life people" in the rule-making process. Exercises were generally regarded as 
the most effective mechanism for maintaining preparedness and overcoming the 
effects of "inadequate" contingency plans. 
On-Scene Coordinators tended to promote strengthening "understanding 
and enforcing" current regulations and strengthening and funding Local 
Emergency Planning Committees. They generally agreed that contingency plans 
are the beginning of the planning process, not the end, advocating frequent 
testing of the Plans and resistance by planners to overconfidence and 
embellishment of capabilities. 
Even with the potential improvements voiced by these respondents, the 
vulnerabilities to deviant outcomes clearly remain. If, as Environmental, Health 
and Safety respondents advocate, more control was granted to manage planning 
as a local issue with less severe scenarios, organizational capture of the role of 
defining risk and disqualification of "extreme" scenarios (Clarke 1988; 1993) 
seems certain. Information restriction and low public interest only exacerbate the 
situation, and On-Scene Coordinator recommendations to develop better 
contingency plans could not be successful under those conditions. Such a 
situation seems illustrative of both Meyer and Rowan's (1991) notion of structure 
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to gain legitimacy and Gephart's (1984) notion of domination through "political 
sense-making" (p.212). 
Summary of Risk Perception as a Driver for Contingency Planning 
As the foundation for planning and response activities, facility contingency plans 
seem to offer a great deal of reassurance. After all, these documents 
demonstrate the careful consideration of significant events and impacts, and 
controls and response actions are laid out in great detail by the risk managers. 
Risk Management Program components require the analysis of standardized 
worst-case scenarios and potential offsite consequences, and all the information 
is shared with Local Emergency Responders and State and Federal On-Scene 
Coordinators. With such in-depth analysis and sharing of information, there 
would seem to be little potential for error and even less for doubt that everyone's 
interests are served. However, what is made abundantly clear by the analysis in 
this chapter is that planners and responders are deeply divided over what to plan 
for and how to do so. The toughest question to answer for this group seems not 
to be a scientific one of magnitude or consequences, but rather how to select 
scenarios in terms of "what makes sense." It is in attempting to answer this 
question that the influences of individual risk perception are manifested and lines 
are drawn between insider groups. The mutually acceptable middle ground 
remains elusive as arguments are made by all sides against scenarios judged 
too "extreme" or "weak," each group or individual defending their own "common 
sense" and "realistic" approach. 
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Regarding regulations as a foundation for planning and response 
activities, many respondents condemned them as complex, vague, ineffective, 
even "handcuffing" the process by eliminating flexibility. Others agreed, but 
insisted that a regulatory approach was necessary "to make it happen." 
Presuming that regulations would guide the process and be followed, many 
respondents indicated a reliance on facilities to assume the lead role in defining 
and analyzing risk (Clark 1988), while at the same time indicating a discomfort or 
"sinking feeling" that doing so made them vulnerable to recreancy (Freudenburg 
1993), or in their words, "bad surprises." The resulting contingency plans, offsite 
responders say, leave all involved doing a great deal of "filling in the blanks." 
The public has a great deal of potential influence in the planning process, 
but according to these respondents forfeits nearly every opportunity to do so, 
whether through trust or apathy. Often regarded as "potentially contentious," 
most respondents felt that the public should have some role in the process, but 
disagreed strongly on what that role should be. Some assumed a paternal role 
while others felt that the public should "drive the whole thing." Open door policies 
were blunted by safety and security concerns, and many felt that "complex 
processes" validated the need for expert analysis. Combined with self-reported 
feelings of a "relatively good historical record," organizations assume the role of 
defining risk (Clarke 1988). 
Although no respondents used the term "fantasy documents" (Clarke 
1999; Clarke and Perrow 1996) to describe contingency plans, there can be no 
doubt that this sociological theory is precisely what was being described. 
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Outside of Environmental, Health and Safety respondents, these documents are 
generally perceived as well written and compliant, but "worthless" representing 
only "paper exercises." Local Emergency Responders and On-Scene 
Coordinators are critical of the heavy reliance on consultants to develop the 
Plans, while Environmental, Health and Safety respondents defend the practice 
as adding consistency and objectivity. In the end, reliability of contingency plans 
was generally dismissed by outside responders, while all respondents highly 
valued having key decision makers in place during an emergency that could 
anticipate and recognize Plan failures. Debate continued over whether the need 
for that talent was due to poor planning or simply the need to adapt to changing 
conditions. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter concludes the research project and is grouped into five sections: 
Summary of Research; Theoretical Implications; Practical Implications; 
Assumptions and Limitations; concluding with Directions for Future Research, 
which offers recommendations to other researchers for building upon this study. 
Summary of Research 
The goal of this study was to gain a better understanding of how planning and 
emergency response "insiders," which in this study include facility Environmental, 
Health and Safety Managers, State and Federal On-Scene Coordinators and 
Local Emergency Responders, identify, debate and eventually define and 
address risk from the participant facilities. This was done through the 
examination of two research questions. First, how do insiders perceive risk and 
define worst-case scenarios? Second, how does risk perception drive 
contingency planning? In the first chapter, the reader was introduced to the role 
of facility contingency plans as the basis of all emergency planning and response 
activities. As a foundation document, it is critical that facility contingency plans 
accurately identify, assess and communicate risks, and this responsibility falls in 
large part to the facility personnel developing the plans. However, intentionally or 
not, organizations tend to underestimate risk, leading to the statement of the 
problem addressed by this research, which is that contingency plans that 
underestimate risk and do not accurately depict worst-case scenarios 
significantly increase vulnerability and risk for facility, response and offsite 
personnel. 
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In the second chapter, the researcher presented a brief overview of six 
major programs that fairly represent the extensive array of existing and pending 
regulations related to activities conducted at the participant facilities. Regardless 
of the extensive regulatory framework, regulated and affected communities are 
left to their own devices to construct the appropriate controls and checks. This 
critical process is what many respondents referred to in Chapters 5 and 6 of this 
study as "filling in the blanks" and is precisely where the vulnerabilities to 
organizational deviance as discussed in Chapter 3 occur. This regulatory void 
has effectively created a risk management honor system of near complete 
reliance on experts, insiders and contingency plans, encouraging a paternal 
management approach that promotes misplaced confidence and decreased 
vigilance. 
In the third chapter, relevant literature was examined to provide context 
and background information on issues and concepts relevant to the proposed 
research questions. Finding that that vulnerability to catastrophic events is not a 
simple reflection of good management practices, advanced technology or 
security, the researcher notes that organizations are much more complex than 
just an assembly of like-minded employees operating in unison to achieve some 
common goal. It is the interaction and outputs of that dynamic environment that 
are relevant to this research, particularly in the treatment of risk as a social 
construct, not an individual decision. Using that criterion the review of 
sociological literature examined organizational practices that influence risk 
perception and create risk and subsequently vulnerability to disaster. Following 
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the analysis of how various organizational tendencies create and perpetuate 
myths of low risk and emergency preparedness, the researcher identified a 
specific gap in the literature into which this research extends. Specifically that is 
the absence of any examination of the self-reported views and roles of key 
figures in the risk management process, individual organization insiders, in 
defining and addressing risk from potential worst-case events at chemical 
facilities. Having reviewed the relevant literature, the researcher found that with 
some disagreement over disasters as inevitable or as foreseeable and 
preventable, the open literature clearly establishes the role of organizational 
deviance in disaster. The mechanisms include disqualifying and underestimating 
risk; avoiding commitment of resources; political power struggles; illusions of low 
risk and emergency preparedness; and reliance on complex, symbolic 
contingency plans doomed to failure. These "situation normal" organizational 
characteristics create misplaced confidence that leads actors and society to rely 
on what are in reality myths of low risk and emergency preparedness, effectively 
decreasing vigilance and increasing risk. The current regulatory structure offers 
little relief, with near complete reliance on information generated by experts and 
insiders, and public oversight and access to information severely restricted. 
In the fourth chapter, the scope and methods of the research were 
detailed, with specific discussion of the research design, instrument 
development; participants, sample selection, informed consent, initial interviews, 
follow-up interviews, ethical considerations, confidentiality, Institutional Review 
Board Approval, data analysis and coding, document analysis, triangulation and 
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generalizability. The basic interpretive qualitative design used for this study 
relied on direct interaction and extended dialogue with the participants, with data 
collected using partially structured interviews. This approach proved very 
effective and allowed the researcher to collect the necessary data from each 
participant within a variety of settings using a project-specific interview protocol. 
The 20 volunteer participants were purposefully sampled from within a 
major metropolitan area found in the Southwestern United States and the 
USEPA Regional Office with jurisdiction over that area. This city supports a 
significant industrial base with virtually no limit to the type of chemicals that may 
be in process, storage or transit within the area at any given time. Chemical 
inventories at the participant facilities may reach billions of pounds per site with 
worst-case significant offsite consequences measured in miles, potentially 
affecting hundreds of thousands or even millions of people. These largest of 
facilities were preferred since the operations have the potential to affect the 
greatest number of people and consequently are the object of a proportionately 
increased degree and intensity of planning both internally and with external 
agencies. It was felt by the researcher that due to increased planning 
requirements, these facilities would tend to have greater issue awareness, more 
robust contingency plans, mature training and response programs and increased 
interaction with local Emergency Responders and planners. 
Following Institutional Review Board approval, each participant granted 
fully informed consent, participated in the confidential interviews and at the 
conclusion of each interview and debriefing provided a review of data. To 
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preserve complete confidentiality and encourage free and open dialogue, 
interviews were conducted individually, with no discussion or confirmation by the 
researcher of identities or responses of other participants. 
No ethical conflicts were noted and respondents seemed comfortable with 
the researcher's role as an individual student researcher, separated from his 
occupational role at the USEPA and drawing no conclusions outside the scope of 
the research. The confidentiality measures offered to participants were 
successful and necessary to meaningfully engage this very tight-knit, fraternal 
group. The researcher's existing relationship with many of the respondents no 
doubt permitted access and a level of candor not likely to be granted to an 
unknown outsider. 
In the fifth chapter, data analysis addressed the first of two research 
questions: How do insiders perceive risk and define worst-case scenarios? 
Since September 11, 2001 planners must seriously consider both routine 
concerns over accidental releases as well as potential deliberate acts, requiring 
difficult decisions regarding the investment to. be made in the prevention and 
management of potentially catastrophic incidents that may never happen. 
Individual risk perception and organizational dynamics play a key role in making 
those decisions. The process begins with the development of potential scenarios 
by organizations followed by review and debate within the larger group, which 
includes Local Emergency Responders and occasionally On-Scene 
Coordinators. As scenarios and impacts are proposed, debated and eventually 
adopted, Local Emergency Responders and On-Scene Coordinators develop 
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additional plans and allocate resources to respond adequately and safety from 
offsite for events that may involve individual or multiple facilities and have area or 
even regional impacts. 
The evaluation and planning process is not formal and follows no standard 
protocols or format. To gain a better understanding of the initial risk assessment 
and deliberation process, respondents were asked questions regarding risk 
identification and assessment; potential worst-case scenarios beyond those 
addressed in contingency plans; the role of Offsite Consequence Analyses; and 
perceived risk to onsite and offsite responders during worst-case events. Even 
during the interviews and prior to any formal analysis the influence of several 
sociological theories of organizational deviance was apparent. It is apparent that 
for this group ·of respondents the process of defining "realistic" is far from 
resolved. While displaying near consensus on the use of "common sense," 
respondents sharply disagreement over what that was and whose version was 
accurate. 
Respondents were deeply divided on the question of defining worst-case 
scenarios and assessing risk to offsite responders, while on most other questions 
positions and rationales varied less dramatically. Reliance on experts was a 
contentious issue. Environmental, Health and Safety respondents saw this as an 
appropriate application of "common sense," while other respondents objected 
strongly, describing a one-sided approach that favors the facilities, demonstrating 
a power struggle between the parties (Clarke 1988) that ultimately "scales down" 
the significance of the threat posed by the facilities or at least the discussion of it. 
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Facilities and outside responders were polarized regarding worst-case scenarios 
as both extreme and unreasonable or not going far enough, respectively. Local 
Emergency Responders clearly feel a sense of "high risk" for themselves, putting 
them directly at odds with Environmental, Health and Safety respondents, who 
tended to describe outsider risk as a condition completely of their own making. 
This contrast demonstrates the influences of organizational disqualification 
(Clarke 1993), conflict over risk assessment and acceptability (Clarke 1988) and 
political sense making (Gephart 1984). 
In the end Environmental, Health and Safety respondent organizations 
within this participant group have clearly claimed the role of defining acceptable 
risk, and within that group Clarke's (1993) disqualification heuristic is by far the 
dominant influence. Significant accidents or intentional acts remain portrayed as 
rare, unanticipated events, unrealistic and are therefore excluded from 
consideration in contingency plans. From this the organizational output of a 
minority of individuals appears to have been implemented and institutionalized 
even over the concerns of other participants. 
In the sixth chapter, data analysis addressed the second of two research 
questions: How does risk perception drive contingency planning? This is a 
critical issue since as the written output of an internal risk assessment process, a 
facility contingency plan becomes the foundation for all subsequent planning 
regarding that facility. Onsite and offsite responders rely heavily on contingency 
plans regardless of whether they have confidence in them, and frankly there are 
few alternatives. Data analysis has already demonstrated the tendency of 
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emergency response insiders to disregard the mandatory scenarios as either too 
extreme or insufficient, attempting instead to define "realistic" events by relying 
on "common sense." The resulting conflicts over what that term means and 
whose version is correct drive political and scientific power struggles heavily 
reliant on experts and lead to few if any mutually satisfactory conclusions. From 
a "scenario pool" of potential events, planners must evaluate and select those 
deemed appropriate, but it is apparent that this group is deeply divided over what 
to plan for, being unable to agree on what makes sense. Regardless of whose 
version of common sense wins out, the selection of scenarios sets the stage for 
all of the planning that follows. 
To gain a better understanding of the planning process, respondents were 
asked questions regarding incorporation of risk perception into contingency 
plans; use and adequacy of regulations as a basis for planning and response; 
adequacy and efficacy of contingency plans; the role of the public in planning and 
response; and recommendations for improvement. As in Chapter 5, prior to any 
formal analysis the influence of several sociological theories of organizational 
deviance was apparent. The foundation for planning and response activities, 
facility contingency plans seem to offer a great deal of reassurance by 
demonstrating the careful consideration of significant events, impacts and 
controls. However, the mutually acceptable middle ground remains elusive as 
arguments are made by all sides against scenarios judged too "extreme" or 
"weak," each group or individual defending their own "common sense" and 
"realistic" approach. Regulations are apparently not the complete answer for 
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anyone, condemned variously as complex, vague, ineffective and even 
"handcuffs." 
Outside responders rely on facilities to assume the lead role in defining 
and analyzing risk (Clark 1988), while at the same time indicating a discomfort or 
"sinking feeling" that doing so made them vulnerable to recreancy (Freudenburg 
1993), or in their words, "bad surprises." The resulting contingency plans, offsite 
responders say, leave all involved doing a great deal of "filling in the blanks" and 
"hoping for the best." Though their role remains debated, the "potentially 
contentious" public is generally reported to have forfeited nearly every 
opportunity to be involved, whether through trust or apathy. 
Although no respondents used the term "fantasy documents" (Clarke 
1999; Clarke and Perrow 1996) to describe contingency plans, there can be no 
doubt that this sociological theory is precisely what was being described. Aside 
from Environmental, Health and Safety respondents, these documents are 
generally regarded as well written and compliant, but "basically worthless" 
representing only "paper exercises." Local Emergency Responders and On-
Scene Coordinators are critical of the heavy reliance on consultants to develop 
the Plans, while Environmental, Health and Safety respondents defend the 
practice as adding consistency and objectivity. As a group, reliability of 
contingency plans was generally dismissed by outside responders, while all 
respondents highly valued having key decision makers in place during an 
emergency that could anticipate and recognize Plan failures. There was strong 
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debate over whether the need for that talent was due to poor planning or simply 
the need to adapt to changing conditions. 
In summary, the researcher found influences of several sociological 
theories of organizational deviance consistently demonstrated within this insider 
group of risk managers. Risk perception, the critical first step in the management 
process, is clearly influenced by Clarke's (1993) disqualification heuristic, 
particularly within the Environmental, Health and Safety respondent 
organizations. Thus, subsequent decisions and outcomes are effectively framed 
if not decided before deliberation outside the organization begins. Through 
reliance on experts and information dependencies those organizations, not the 
public, have assumed the lead role in defining and managing risk (Clarke 1988). 
The resulting contingency plans are openly dismissed by planners and 
responders outside of those who authored them and clearly are not serving their 
intended purpose. No one describes feeling safer with them in place, and even 
their authors decline to characterize plans as adequate for the job, instead 
relying on compliance with obviously limited regulations as the measure of 
sufficiency. In every way, these respondents clearly confirm the role of 
contingency plans as "fantasy documents" (Clarke and Perrow 1996; Clarke 
1999), institutionalized even over the objections of most users. Gephart's (1984) 
notion of political sense-making is supported by this interaction between the 
parties, particularly in the construction of accidents as rare and unanticipated and 
the use of science by organized capital to minimize risk. In the cases of facilities 
described by respondents as knowingly publishing contingency plans that 
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overestimate capabilities, the researcher sees validation of Meyer and Rowan's 
(1991) notion of using structure to gain legitimacy. 
Theoretical Implications 
The focus of this research was on insider risk perception and how those 
perceptions drive worst-case contingency planning. Although key figures in the 
risk management process, within the open literature there had previously been 
no examination of the self-reported views and roles of individual organization 
insiders in defining and addressing risk from potential worst-case events at 
chemical facilities. In conducting this study, the researcher sought to make an 
intellectual contribution by extending the existing body of work on organizational 
deviance, risk and disaster to this new area of inquiry. 
When developing the proposal for this study, the researcher neither found 
nor proposed a single theory that universally explained the tendency of 
organizations to underestimate risk and embrace contingency plans as the 
ultimate management tool. However, Clarke's (1993) disqualification heuristic 
seemed likely to be a key contributor, particularly in the critical first step of risk 
assessment for scenarios to be considered. When risk perception does not 
reflect scientifically assessed risk, decision-makers can protect themselves from 
seriously considering the likelihood of disasters, preserving resources by 
constructing outcomes that avoid extensive response preparedness. 
Underestimating or disqualifying risk simplifies the process of controlling it, 
making "adequate" planning and preparedness a near-certainty. As contingency 
plans are institutionalized, confidence in the ability to manage all hazards with 
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minimal cost and effort grows, perpetuating the myths of low risk and emergency 
preparedness. Having conducted these personal interviews and carefully 
analyzed the data, the researcher concludes that this theory is clearly 
demonstrated within the participant group as the origin of a great deal of conflict 
within the risk assessment process. While decision-makers conducting the initial 
evaluation of scenarios may willingly protect themselves from serious 
consideration of disaster, the second tier of decision-makers, Local Emergency 
Responders, is effectively prevented from performing any meaningful analysis 
due to the constraints of the contingency plan from which they must draw their 
information. Thus the initial framing of risk seals the fate of secondary analysis. 
On this point the researcher is supported by Gephart's (2004) notion of power in 
"mundane features of human communication" (p. 25) and the macro-level effects 
of "micro-level sense making" (p. 25). 
On the subject of accountability for deviant outcomes, it occurs to the 
researcher that two key theories initially seen by him as competing are actually 
much closer in nature than first thought. Turner's (1976) notion of "failures of 
foresight" paints disasters as predictable and even expected, finding common 
characteristics of ignoring the possibility of disaster; paying attention to nuisance 
problems and none to larger background issues; ignoring outside complaints; 
ambiguous, vague or complex information; over-reliance on subcontractors; 
failure to comply with regulations; and ignoring warning signs. Each applicable 
"failure" is said to be readily identified following the loss and although manifested 
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prior to the impending disaster was disregarded as a warning, hence "failures of 
foresight" (p. 378). 
Turner's primary characteristic of failure is ignoring the possibility of 
disaster, directly in line with Clarke's (1993) notion of disqualification. Following 
a disaster, disqualification of the relevant potential hazard or risk inevitably 
proves in hindsight to have been the "wrong" decision, with all of the 
accompanying demands for accountability. Such demands are effectively 
accusations of failures of foresight. In this study, the researcher references the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 as a clear example of that but numerous 
other events well illustrate the point, including Exxon Valdez, the Chernobyl 
reactor meltdown, the near-disaster at Three Mile Island and countless other 
tragedies ranging from airliner crashes to health crises. 
With the clear vision of hindsight, few if any disasters are found to have 
been completely unforeseeable and therefore in theory all could have been 
prevented. Of course, debate might rage over what degree of foresight was 
possible or reasonable, which brings the parties full circle to one of the key 
arguments between respondents in this study, that being the definition of 
"realistic" or "reasonable." Obviously, if the risk is not perceived or is disqualified, 
then measures to guard against it cannot be employed. This observation was 
made in historical times by Sun-Tzu in his counseling of Emperors and Generals 
of circa 600 B.C. China on the successful waging of warfare. The ability to 
understand those factors that define one's relationship with the enemy, in our 
modern case disasters, and actively control and shape the situation to one's 
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advantage, in our case risk management, was considered an absolute necessity 
for the competent commander, in our case a planner (Sun-Tzu n.d.:78). The 
Master observed succinctly, "All things and events that have a distinguishing 
shape or disposition can be named, and all things that can be named can be 
prevailed over" (Sun-Tzu n.d.:79). Then, as now failures of foresight or 
disqualification of risk often proved deadly, clearly demonstrating the critical role 
of adequate risk assessment as the foundation of all planning activities. 
In summary, the entire process of risk management and contingency 
planning is required, designed and generally said by these respondents to be 
"open" in that anyone and everyone may participate and have equal input and 
influence. However, the reality seems quite the opposite. Insiders operating 
within various constraints and with sometimes competing interests clearly control 
the process. Although key figures, within the open literature there had previously 
been no examination of the self-reported views and roles of individual 
organization insiders in defining and addressing risk from potential worst-case 
events at chemical facilities. This research focused on insider risk perception 
and how those perceptions drive worst-case contingency planning, and has 
made an intellectual contribution by extending the existing body of work on 
organizational deviance, risk and disaster to this new area of inquiry. There 
remains no single theory to universally explain the tendency of organizations to 
underestimate risk and rely on contingency plans to control worst-case events. 
As evidenced in this research, many sociological theories of organizational 
deviance actively influence the risk management and planning process. 
RISK PERCEPTION 136 
However, this study has identified Clarke's (1993) notion of the disqualification 
heuristic as dominant in that it influences the entire risk management process by 
effectively framing the critical first step, that being the initial assessment of risk 
and scenarios. Having limited that step to "winnable" scenarios, the positive 
outcome of any subsequent planning is assured. 
Practical Implications 
Although many existing programs require tracking and reporting of hazardous 
material inventories, usage, emissions and uncontrolled releases, none requires 
or encourages anything that could be truly interpreted as risk assessment. From 
a Disaster and Emergency Management perspective, the focus remains first-
responder preparedness for acute events affecting large areas and general 
populations. 
Having completed this study, the researcher proposes several practical 
implications and supporting recommendations. Any or all of these lessons 
learned may prove useful to the respondents in their respective or joint risk 
management and planning efforts. While several general implications are 
discussed, overall it is clear to the researcher that risk managers must address 
four critical issues. First, the public has not effectively engaged the risk 
"c 
management process. Second, common sense is not a reliable risk evaluation 
tool. Third, planners and onsite and offsite responders must improve 
communication and move closer together throughout the entire process. Fourth, 
contingency plans are not serving their intended purpose for anyone. In the 
researcher's opinion, the only chance for improvement is more and earlier 
I 
J 
RISK PERCEPTION 137 
external stakeholder input, better understanding of risk and the implications of it 
and development of more reliable assessment tools. 
In attempting to overcome the disadvantages of current risk assessment 
methods, it is important to integrate the principles of legitimation, democracy and 
fully informed discourse. This process begins with opening and maintaining a 
dialogue with interested stakeholders in the community to develop and maintain 
a collaborative learning process to share information with stakeholders and/or 
their representatives regarding issues and concerns. In many cases it might be 
appropriate to use the collaborative learning process to increase stakeholder 
understanding of issues prior to integrating their input into the decision-making 
process (Lundgren 1998). Stakeholder input is critical and while On-Scene 
Coordinators and other insider "experts" might certainly be asked to provide a 
great deal of information, interpretation and recommendations, this should be 
offered in conjunction with a group process not in place of it. It is important to let 
the discussion inform the decision-making and to involve the community in 
evaluating data and determining acceptable risk levels. It is always difficult to 
discuss scenarios involving fatalities, fireballs, explosions and chemical 
contamination without arousing a great deal of concern and based on the lack of 
experience in most communities with such catastrophic events the initial reaction 
may well be one of alarm. However, an open-group evaluation process improves 
community awareness of the issues and increases public confidence in the risk 
management process. The goal at this stage of the process is to develop 
specific understandings of "acceptable risk" so that potential mitigation measures 
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may be evaluated objectively. In all cases, the object is to generate fair and 
informed discourse and reduce as much risk as possible. Experts are used at 
this point only to supplement the process and add understanding. 
Federal On-Scene Coordinators certainly have a broad view of the issues, 
and operating in numerous states should give them useful insights into the risk 
management process. However, many respondents, including On-Scene 
Coordinators, conceded that the lack of a local presence of Federal 
representatives prevents them from being actively engaged or even being 
perceived as a viable resource. The data suggest that one solution to this might 
be to station these personnel in areas where the response history, complex 
industrial base and planning needs represent a high demand for their services. 
Personnel within USEPA frequently refer to this as "outposting" and the practice 
is employed to great success in various other USEPA regions. The area 
involved in this study would certainly meet the need criterion. The researcher 
recommends that USEPA give serious consideration to outposting Federal On-
Scene Coordinators to active, high demand areas, creating the opportunity for 
them to become an integral resource for the local planning and response 
program. Potential benefits include improved planning, reduced response time 
and the encouragement of objectivity and public involvement through the Federal 
presence. As local issues could then become a realistic outreach priority for the 
On-Scene Coordinators, visibility and effectiveness of the entire process may be 
enhanced with improved communication. Involved parties would effectively be 
"closer together" at all levels of planning and response. That approach might be 
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significantly less expensive and more efficient than the current alternative of 
simply sending personnel as needed to and from sites, as that increases travel 
costs and travel time, reducing productivity and available economic resources. 
Internal analysis could confirm whether economic benefits could be gained. 
Regarding contingency plans, the consensus of most respondents and the 
researcher is that plans must be simplified and made more useful to the process 
of planning and responding. Currently, they are effectively relegated to a 
ritualistic compliance document that serves primarily to force the parties to 
engage in at least some amount of planning. However, it appears that beyond 
this there is little if any perceived residual value. While written plans would not 
realistically be done away with, the researcher found it compelling that so many 
respondents were adamant that "no one" reads them, nor does anyone 
apparently "run for them" during an event. It was generally considered a far more 
valuable asset simply to have "the right guy in charge," who ostensibly knows 
what to do and how to "get it done." That qualification fairly represents the typical 
approach employed successfully by On-Scene Coordinators when responding to 
major events. Those individuals are highly trained, have significant emergency 
procurement authorities and integrate with local and federal resources once in 
the field. With few exceptions, pre-existing contingency plans are not a 
document held in hand by these professionals while responding. Rather, they 
employ good use of tactics, resources and skills to rapidly assess the situation 
and dispatch resources as appropriate to bring the event to a safe and efficient 
conclusion. However, these personnel do not simply create order out of chaos. 
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Much credit must be given to the planning that should already have occurred at 
the facility and in the region, and many people and resources are actively 
involved, particularly in larger events. 
There is no doubt that planning must occur, but flexibility and quality of 
leadership are equally critical. Poor incident management can and does undo 
any amount of planning however well done. It is equally true that good 
management and tactics can overcome poor planning, though the consequences 
may be greater due to the failure of initial response. Minutes do matter, 
particularly in an emergency where actions taken in the first few minutes or hours 
influence everything that follows. For these reasons, the researcher 
recommends that in addition to regulatory components contingency plans should 
focus on how and what resources may be brought to bear when events differ 
from planned. One respondent made a very good point by emphasizing attempts 
to learn when and where the plan might fail. Exercises are a very good way to 
do this, but only if done objectively and in earnest. It helps no one to conduct a 
mild exercise and declare success. Planners must be frank in their estimates of 
capabilities and outcomes and open in communicating this with stakeholders. If 
nothing else, the process of planning serves to prioritize, build confidence, 
illustrate past or potential failures and build on lessons learned. In a speech to 
the National Defense Executive Reserve Conference then-president Dwight D. 
Eisenhower (1957) remarked on plans and planning: 
I tell this story to illustrate the truth of the statement I heard long ago in the Army: Plans 
are worthless, but planning is everything. There is a very great distinction because when 
you are planning for an emergency you must start with this one thing: the very definition 
of 'emergency' is that it is unexpected, therefore it is not going to happen the way you are 
planning. 
RISK PERCEPTION 141 
A fundamental step in risk management must be to adequately identify 
and frame it. As noted previously Sun-Tzu (n.d.) observed, "All things and 
events that have a distinguishing shape or disposition can be named, and all 
things that can be named can be prevailed over" (p. 79). In seeking to prevail 
over chemical facility disasters, the researcher proposes that adequate 
identification of the potential effects and costs of disasters would drive more 
serious consideration of the prevention of them. Ultimately this discourse should 
drive the controls needed to achieve the desired minimized risk. To do this, we 
as planners must overcome the tendency to rely on hunches, intuition, common 
sense or other unreliable tools for framing our work. Extensive review of existing 
resources, including regulatory programs, agency and professional standards, 
pending legislation, assessment tools and emerging USEPA policies clearly 
illustrates several shortcomings in our arsenal. Risk from chemical facilities is 
not systematically assessed; risk reduction is subjective, inefficient and not 
required; current Offsite Consequence Analysis methods are neither 
standardized nor rigorous and predict only impact edge effects, not gradients; 
and receptor analysis is generic and based on census estimates. As a result, 
risk remains underestimated and loosely managed, even when done according to 
all current standards. To overcome this we need better tools. 
The researcher recommends development of a protocol that adequately 
quantifies risk and potential impacts and supports community efforts to plan, 
mitigate, allocate resources and respond effectively to emergencies. All potential 
losses must be addressed including fatalities, injuries, welfare (property, 
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services) and environmental. Key components of the protocol would include: 
incorporation of Risk Management Program requirements dealing with worst-
case scenarios and Offsite Consequence Analysis; detailed receptor 
identification and analysis (Most Exposed Individuals etc.); loss and cost 
gradients within predicted impact areas; and spatially projected data using a 
Geographical Information System (GIS). As discussed, with the exception of the 
Risk Management Program regulatory framework, these necessary components 
do not currently exist. In this protocol, risk assessment components would be 
added to Offsite Consequence Analysis requirements to address mitigation 
evaluation, risk optimization strategies and cost-benefit features. While such a 
tool would dramatically increase the understanding of the implications of risk at 
chemical facilities, its real power would lie not in the statistical best estimate of 
cost or loss, but rather in the discussions that should follow in the open and 
informed analysis of risk from the perspective of the entire affected community. 
On the subject of defining and using worst-case scenarios, Offsite 
Consequence Analyses or any other assessment criteria, the researcher 
concludes that benchmarks must be set to provide consistency for at least a 
minimum of planning. The fact of the matter is that large, catastrophic events do 
occur at these chemical facilities and that current contingency planning 
approaches instill little confidence in either the generators or the consumers of 
the information. The real issues then are how large and what type of events to 
plan for, what can be done to prevent, respond to or recover from them and how 
best to do that. In keeping with the goal of community involvement and open 
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dialogue, it follows that the proper discussion of these matters should fall to the 
affected stakeholders. Only that group can truly determine how much risk is 
acceptable and what is to be done about it. The role of the Federal government 
may be to continue providing the regulatory infrastructure and oversight 
necessary to ensure a certain planning effort, but communities must take the 
leadership role in managing that process at their level. Of course, this all hinges 
on involved parties making honest efforts at every level. As demonstrated in this 
study many sociological theories of organizational deviance are clearly 
demonstrated to be active in the risk management process. However, few if any 
appear to be the result of intentional, strategic designs. They are more likely the 
products of pervasive influences on people making complex decisions in complex 
environments. This is all the more reason to conduct risk management under the 
bright light of open and informed dialogue. 
In conclusion, in terms of practical implications insights from this research 
may help facilities and communities gain a better understanding of the reality of 
risk and the potential consequences of inadequate framing of it. If acted upon, 
such awareness should drive stakeholder discussions and serve to legitimately 
increase confidence while decreasing vulnerability and risk for facility, response 
and offsite personnel through improved planning and informed discourse. 
Directions for Future Research 
This research focused on a specific group of planners and emergency response 
insiders within a single metropolitan area, and the data collected provided many 
useful insights. However, there are numerous opportunities for future research to 
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build upon this study. Key areas of interest might include the addition of general 
public respondents, maturity and robustness of local planning and emergency 
response programs, inclusion of less significant offsite consequence facilities and 
studies within or across larger or smaller metropolitan areas. Within each of 
these potential themes, a researcher may wish to evaluate the influences of 
economics, education, accident history or other relevant factors. Past research 
has raised questions of environmental justice regarding many of the issues 
examined in this study. Future research might look explicitly at this topic by 
examining factors such as socioeconomic status, race, ethnicity and special 
populations such as the elderly. Specific recommendations are made in the 
following discussions as to where this might be appropriate. Of course, 
opportunities for such analyses are certainly not restricted to those discussed 
here, and future researchers are encouraged to seek those out as they see fit. 
Public perception of the issues addressed in this study could be examined 
in at least two ways. First, in a given study area members of the general public 
might be identified who are actively involved in the planning process through 
Local Emergency Planning Committees or other Right-to-Know or public 
interaction mechanisms. Although these individuals in theory function within the 
planning process in an insider role, such individuals are in reality only "quasi-
insiders" since their direct knowledge of agency and facility experiences, issues 
and resources is limited due to a lack of professional immersion in the daily 
operations of the respective parties. Based on the responses in the current 
study, these persons would also likely be penalized by insiders whether overtly or 
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innocently as "non-experts." Of interest to the researcher, this puts them in a 
situation not unlike Local Emergency Responders and On-Scene Coordinators in 
being viewed as relative outsiders to the process and having to consider and act 
upon plans and information generated almost entirely by facility Environmental, 
Health and Safety Managers. A second research opportunity for examination of 
public perspective regarding planning and response issues would be to include 
representatives from populations adjacent to the participant facilities as 
respondents. These individuals would effectively be outsiders to the process and 
almost certainly viewed by insiders as non-experts. However, the views of these 
outsider respondents would be of great interest in evaluating how these 
populations feel about the typically paternal management of the planning and 
response process. Such studies may also prove useful for researchers 
interested in environmental justice issues. 
The participants in the current study are part of a very robust, mature 
planning and emergency response program. The facilities are very large, internal 
and municipal response Teams are well trained and equipped and their peers in 
other communities generally consider the program as arguably the best in the 
United States. Although resources and training for these planners and 
responders is not a significant limiting factor in the performance of their duties, it 
may very well be in other communities. Future research should incorporate 
some analysis of this to examine whether the strength of the planning and 
response program is affected by resource constraints and how that might 
influence the overall contingency planning process. 
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A similar study conducted in a larger or smaller metropolitan area might 
yield insights into the dynamics and influences of the various sociological 
theories noted in the current project and how facility significance within the 
community affects that. For example, in smaller areas where industrial clusters 
make the participant facilities disproportionately significant employers or 
economic contributors, the effects may differ from areas where these facilities are 
much less "vital" components of the local economy. Such a study might attempt 
to discern economic impacts as one criterion for evaluating perceived influence. 
As with the inclusion of the general public as respondents, these avenues of 
research might generate environmental justice implications. A variant of this 
approach, additional research could also analyze or compare multiple, similar 
areas across regions or States to evaluate the relative absence or presence of 
the sociological theories of organization deviance discussed in the current study 
in those other areas. 
Another potential area of interest for future research would be a focus on 
facilities with less significant potential offsite consequences. Though individually 
the potential effects from these facilities are less severe, the sites are much more 
numerous than the large facilities in the current study and tend to be collocated 
and intermixed with both residential areas and each other. Examples include 
farm supply centers with large inventories of anhydrous ammonia and other 
agricultural chemicals, retail propane distributors with bulk flammable gas 
storage and virtually countless small to medium sized chemical manufacturing, 
transportation or processing facilities. These facilities tend to be "lower visibility" 
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than the very large facilities, as they are often integrated into the community, 
more accessible and may be engaged in retail activities that directly impact 
residents, for example filling gas grill cylinders for cooking or ammonia "nurse 
tanks" for fertilizing fields. Research in this area might focus on whether these 
"friendly" or "familiar'' facilities are seen as safer and why, even though the 
potential offsite impacts are significant, measured in miles in some cases. They 
are often less regulated as in the case of retail propane fuel facilities being 
exempt from Risk Management Program requirements. Several respondents in 
the current study made note that exempt or minimally regulated facilities were 
often the source of releases and the focus of after-accident investigations. 
A key area of opportunity for future study recommended by the researcher 
is the research and development of the comprehensive risk assessment protocol 
discussed in Practical Implications within this chapter. The uses for such a tool 
would not be limited to chemical facilities and could be adapted to assess 
potential impacts from any disaster, whether technological or natural. 
For the current study the basic interpretive qualitative design worked well, 
with the researcher relying on direct interaction and extended dialogue with 
participants via partially structured interviews. This approach proved an excellent 
mechanism by which to collect the necessary data within each participant's 
operating environment. The data coding method used was equally effective and 
the researcher recommends it for future efforts. Another tool sometimes used to 
evaluate how individuals perceive their environment based on their respective 
points of view, Q methodology, may be useful for additional analysis of data 
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collected from this study. To facilitate Q methodology the researcher must 
compile a sample of statements that represent the expected range of opinions 
within the participant group regarding the topic of interest. The existing data set 
would support this additional analysis as most answers were brief and on point 
and participants provided many relevant quotes and observations. 
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Informed Consent Letter for Adult Participants 
Risk Perception and Worst-Case Contingency Planning: An Examination of 
Emergency Response Insiders within a Major Metropolitan Area 
Dear Participant: 
As part of my Doctoral degree requirements for Oklahoma State University, I am 
conducting a study of risk perception and contingency planning related to 
chemical facilities and emergency planning and response "insiders" in your 
metropolitan area. "Insiders" as referenced in my research include facility 
Environmental, Health and Safety Managers, State and Federal On-Scene 
Coordinators and Local Emergency Responders. I am interested in how insiders 
perceive risk and define worst-case scenarios and how risk perception drives 
contingency planning. These questions are important because insiders who 
perceive risk as low or who disqualify potential worst-case scenarios from 
consideration may be more likely to develop contingency plans not sufficiently 
protective of affected populations and facilities. This research could prove useful 
to facility managers, emergency responders, regulatory agencies and potentially 
affected populations since for each of these groups it is critical that contingency 
plans address realistic worst-case scenarios to properly allocate resources and 
prevent or safely manage incidents. 
The research is designed as a basic interpretive qualitative study and data will be 
collected through direct interviews. All participants are adults and professionals 
in their respective fields and you will only be asked questions pertaining to your 
job-related duties, with no personal or facility information or identifiers collected. 
Interview records and the final research report will use only coded identifiers for 
names and locations, preventing any linkage of facilities or persons to specific 
results, geographic area or even the study. This letter is to be sent for your 
review in advance of each interview and reviewed again with you during the 
introductory meeting, with adequate attention paid to the confidentiality 
protections offered. At that time, I will answer any questions and ask that you 
confirm whether you wish to participate in this study by signing and dating this 
consent form. Your involvement will not be disclosed or confirmed by me to 
anyone else. I intend to protect your identity to the fullest extent possible. 
Following the interview, we will go through a debriefing to discuss questions or 
concerns. To preserve complete confidentiality and to encourage free and open 
dialogue, interviews will be conducted individually and at a location of your 
choosing. I expect that the interview will last less than one (1) hour. Anticipating 
that the initial interviews and data review will generate insightful follow-up 
questions, I may contact you by telephone to ask those additional questions 
and/or to gain clarification of original interview content. The follow-up interview 
will probably last less than 20 minutes. All records will be kept in a secure 
location and when no longer needed, will be destroyed. 
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This study will result in a written dissertation submitted to Oklahoma State 
University, and the analysis may also result in published articles and 
presentations at professional conferences. At all times, the confidentiality 
protections offered will remain in place. 
Participation in this study is voluntary. You may decline to participate, and if 
you initially choose to participate in the study, you are free to withdraw 
permission at any time upon notifying Scott Harris (Primary Investigator). You 
will not be penalized for declining or withdrawing, and if at any time during this 
study you have questions or concerns about your rights as a research 
participant, you may contact: 
Carol Olson, Ph.D., Chair, Institutional Review Board 
415 Whitehurst, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, OK 74078 
(405) 744-5700 
If you have further questions or concerns, please contact Scott Harris (Primary 
Investigator) or Dr. Gary Webb (Dissertation Research Advisor) at the following 
addresses and telephone numbers. Thank you for participating in this study. 
Sincerely yours, 
Scott Harris 
2400 State Highway 121, Apt. 1907 
Euless, TX 76039 
(817) 399-9515 
Consent Documentation: 
Gary Webb, Ph.D. 
006 Classroom Building 
Oklahoma State University 
Stillwater, OK 74078 
(405) 744-8752 
Do you grant permission to participate in this research? 
Yes No --
Do you grant permission to be audiotaped? 
Yes No __ 
I guarantee that the procedures and confidentiality protections described in 
this consent letter will be adhered to and agree to these terms: 
Signature of researcher------------- Date ____ _ 
I have read and fully understand this consent form. I agree to these terms 
and sign it freely and voluntarily. A copy has been given to me. 
Signature of participant------------- Date ____ _ 
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Interview Protocol 
Core Questions for Partially Structured Interviews 
Risk Perception and Worst-Case Contingency Planning: An Examination of 
Emergency Response Insiders within a Major Metropolitan Area 
Coded Identifier: ------
1 . For contingency planning purposes, how do you determine which potential 
threats and events are realistic? 
2. How do you incorporate your perceptions of risk and worst-case events into 
contingency plans and response training? 
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3. How are potential offsite consequences incorporated into the planning and 
response process? 
4. How adequate are the regulations pertaining to this/these facilities as a basis 
for planning and response? 
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5. How adequate are the contingency plans addressing this/these facilities? 
6. How risky would it be for onsite emergency personnel responding to a worst-
case design event at this/these facilities? 
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7. How risky would it be for offsite emergency personnel responding to a worst-
case design event at this/these facilities? 
8. How does the public fit into your risk evaluation and planning process? 
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9. Forget about the written, "official" plans. In your opinion, what is the worst-
case scenario for this/these facilities? 
10. What should/could be done to lower risk and increase the success of planning 
and response for this/these facilities? 
11. Describe your role in developing or implementing the facility or area CP. 
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Appendix C: Institutional Review Board Approval 
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Oklahoma State University 
Institutional Review Board 
Protocol Expires: 9/1812004 
Date; Friday, September 19, 2003 IRB Application No GU042 
Proposal ntle: Risk Peroeption and Worst-Case Contingency Planning; An Examination of Emergency 




Kenneth Scott Harris ~ Gary Webb 
.;,.Vi/PO ~ #""'f ,:; I 006 Classroom 
-Slilhaalc1, OK 14078 Stillwater, OK 74078 
£u.k..J'5, )'-,t :, {/#3 ~ 
Reviewed and 
Processed as: Exempt 
Approval Status Recommended by Reviewer(s); Approved 
Dear Pl; 
Your IRB application referenced above has been approved for one calendar year. Please make note of 
the expiration date indicated above. It is the judgment of the reviewers that the rights and welfare of 
individuals who may be asked to participate in this study will be respected, and that the research will be 
conducted in a manner consistent with the IRB requirements as outlined in section 45 CFR 46. 
As Principal Investigator, it is your responsibility to do the following: 
1. Conduct this study exactly as it has been approved. Any modifications to the research protocol 
must be submitted with the appropriate signatures for IRB approval. 
2. Submit a request for continuation if the study extends beyond the approval period of one calendar 
year. This continuation must receive IRB review and approval before the research can continue. 
3. Report any adverse events to the IRB Chair promptly. Adverse events are those which are 
unanticipated and impact the subjects during the course of this research: and 
4. Notify the IRB office in writing when your research project is complete. 
Please note that approved projects are subject to monitoring by the IRB. If you have questions about the 
IRB procedures or need any assistance from the Board, please contact Sharon Bacher, the Executive 
Secretary to the IRB, in 415 Whitehurst (phone: 405-744-5700, sbacher@okstate.edu). 
Sincerely, 
Carol Olson, Chair 
Institutional Review Board 
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